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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHANGING AMERICAN
WORKPLACE
On February 20, 1980, the United States Supreme Court declared faculty members at Yeshiva University to be managerial
employees and therefore not entitled to organize under the National Labor Relations Act.' On May 13, 1980, Lee A. Iacocca,
President of Chrysler Corporation, 2 announced the appointment of Douglas A. Fraser, President of the United Automobile
4
Workers, 3 to the Board of Directors of Chrysler Corporation.
These two events are symptomatic of the fundamental transformation occurring in the relationship between employees and
their employers in the American workplace. The working conditions, and therefore the interests, of professionals and blue5
collar employees seem to be converging. Many professionals,
such as doctors and lawyers, are exchanging their traditional
autonomous status for positions within large, hierarchical
1. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). For a discussion of
Yeshiva, see text accompanying notes 415-67 infra. This Article will refer to
the National Labor Relations Act, including the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1976) (Wagner Act), the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)
(Taft-Hartley Amendments), the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.), Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (Health Care
Amendments; codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 169, 183 (1976)), as the NLRA or
the Act. The National Labor Relations Board will be referred to as the NLRB
or the Board.
2. Chrysler Corporation is the seventeenth largest United States corporation in terms of sales. The Fortune Directoryof the 500 Largest U.S. Industrial
Corporations,FoRTuNE, May 5, 1980, at 276.
3. The United Automobile Workers has 1,500,000 members. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AssociLvTONs 1216 (15th ed. 1980).
4. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1980, § D, at 1, col. 3; Wall St. J., May 14, 1980, at 6,
col 2.
5. For the purposes of this article, a professional will be defined as in section 2(12) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). See text accompaning note
256 infra.
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bureacratic organizations. At the same time, blue-collar workers are beginning to perceive themselves as professionals, and,
their employers are allowing them greater control over their
work environment. In an attempt to attain the prestige and
greater autonomy traditionally enjoyed by professionals, workers have increasingly tended to label themselves professionals.
We are now in an era of professional salespersons, professional
6
secretaries, and professional police officers.
Moreover, job opportunities in our advanced technological
society have increased for professional and white-collar employees, including those with secretarial and clerical skills, and
have decreased for blue-collar employees. 7 These trends are
expected to continue. 8 With the emergence of a large class of
professional and white-collar employees operating on different
principles from the theoretical blue-collar model, and with the
decrease of blue-collar workers who were traditionally unionized, the percentage of the total work force under union contract has fallen dramatically. 9
A transformation in the composition of the employing entities themselves has paralleled and in some instances precipi6. See, e.g., Strauss, Professionalismand Occupational Associations, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, May, 1963, at 8.
7. In 1958, for example, 40.9% of a total work force of 68,213,000, or
27,899,000 workers, were classified as white-collar or professional. U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2070, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LABOR STATISTICS]. In 1978, 49.1% of
a total work force of 99,552,000, or 48,880,000 workers, were classified as whitecollar or professional. Id. In 1958, 41.7% of the total work force, or 28,445,000
workers, were classified as blue-collar. In 1978, only 35.1% of the work force, or
34,943,000 workers, were classified as blue-collar. Id. The number of white-collar workers has been computed by combining the number of professional, technical, managerial, administrative, sales, and clerical workers. Id. Blue-collar
workers include craft and kindred workers, operatives, nonfarm laborers, and
private household workers. Id.
Nearly half the increase in white-collar and professional workers is attributable to an increase in clerical workers, who comprised 17.8% of the total work
force in 1978, as compared with 14.0% in 1958. Id. Secretaries comprise the
largest single group of clerical workers. Their numbers are increasing at an
even faster rate than the number of clerical workers generally. While the
number of clerical workers increased from 14,247,000 in 1972 to 16,904,000 in 1978,
at a growth rate of 18.7%, the number of secretaries for the same period increased from 2,949,000 to 3,590,000 exhibiting a growth rate of 21.7%. U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 417 (100th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
8. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1979, § 1, at 18, col. 1.
9. See Summers, Worker Participationin the U.S. and West Germany: A
Comparative Studyfrom an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. CoM. L. 367, 377-79
(1980). See generally Hardbeck, Unionism Again at a Crossroads,16 LAB. L.J.
100 (1965); Strauss, supra note 6.
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tated these changes in the work force. Private, nonprofit
institutions have experienced, and are continuing to experience, extraordinary growth in size and importance.' 0 Higher
education and health care have become major industries in recent years. Although the NLRA, either explicitly or as interpreted, excluded the employees of hospitals and universities
from its coverage, the law now allows many of these employees
to unionize." Recognizing the transformation of education into
big business,' 2 the National Labor Relations Board took jurisdiction over private colleges and universities in 1970.13 In 1974,
in response to the growth of the health care industry into one
of the largest businesses in the United States, Congress
amended the NLRA to include the employees of private, nonprofit hospitals within its coverage.14 Significantly, a large
number of the employees of nonprofits are professionals and
white-collar workers.
Notwithstanding these developments, professional employees and white-collar workers have been reluctant to unionize,
10. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 835 n.1
(1980).
11. Government employees are still excluded from the NLRA under section 2(2), and the constitutionality of bringing state and local government employees within the coverage of the NLRA has seriously been called into
question by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). These workers are, however, increasingly covered by public employment laws. Many government employees are white-collar, service, and professional employees.
During the 1960s and 1970s, many states enacted public employment relations
acts that extended legal protections to their employees. Thus, in the area of
government employee relations, serious issues of supervisory and managerial
status and subjects of bargaining have arisen. See generally Anderson, The Impact of Public Sector Bargaining, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 986; Edwards, The Emerging
Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv. 885 (1973); Summers,
Public Employee Bargaining: A PoliticalPerspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974);
Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector: The
Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 685;
Wellington & Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargainingin Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969). The issues raised by state law coverage of public employees are beyond the scope of this Article.
12. In 1978, Americans spent $141,200,000,000 on education, comprising 7.1%
of the Gross National Product (GNP). This includes public and private sector
spending at all educational levels. Of this, $49,700,000,000 was spent on higher
education. STATSTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 7, at 136. Education expenditures increased from 3.3% of the GNP in 1950 to 7.1% in 1978, a growth rate of
115%. Id.
13. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 169 (1976). In 1980, the health care industry was
the sixth largest in terms of growth, and the sixteenth largest in terms of profitability. FORBES, Jan. 5, 1981, at 258. In 1978, health care expenditures totaled
$192,400,000,000, comprising 9.1% of the GNP. STATiSTicAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 7, at 100. Health care expenditures increased from 4.5% of the GNP in 1950
to 9.1% in 1978, a growth rate of 102%. Id.

1982]

PROFESSIONALS AND UNIONIZATION

viewing unionization as a form of collective action appropriate
only for rank and file blue-collar employees. Professionals
have, however, acted collectively. They have tended to work
coarchically,15 in a collegial or team fashion, seeking collective
strength through their professional associations. In recent
years, however, the Supreme Court's antitrust decisions have
severely limited the economic power of the professional trade
associations.16 The Supreme Court's opinion in Yeshiva may
now block collective union activity for most professionals. The
professionals' traditional collective associations can no longer
protect their economic interests, and the Supreme Court's narrowed construction of the NLRA's coverage in Yeshiva may
leave professionals without any forum for collective action.
Similarly, many more employees may find themselves excluded
from coverage by the NLRA as increasing numbers of workers
seek to operate in a professional model and as employers functioning under changed organizational structures and management techniques give traditional blue-collar employees broader
responsibilities.
The labor laws of the United States were written for rank
and fie employees employed by a typical hierarchically organized employer.17 They were not written for employees operating coarchically. Under the NLRA as it developed in the
industrial context, individuals having the power to make decisions regarding the quality of products or employees were categorized as either supervisors or managers and excluded from
the statute's coverage. The exclusion of managers and supervisors reinforced the adversary nature of the traditional industrial model. Recently, the changed composition of the labor
force has drawn the validity of the traditional industrial model
into question. Bringing labor policy into line with current realities for professional workers and for nontraditional blue-collar
workers requires recognition of the massive changes in the way
the economy and business structures operate. The first important cases have arisen in the professional area and the course
taken in these cases will establish how the NLRB and the
courts will deal with changed employment relationships.
15. Throughout this Article the word "coarchical" is contrasted with the
word "hierarchial." "Hierarchial" refers to a system of association marked by
the existence of superior and inferior levels of authority; "coarchical" refers to

a system of association in which each member has approximately equal power
and authority. "Coarchical" is similar to "collegial," but in common usage "collegial" is usually limited to a university context.
16. See text accompanying notes 165-69 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 19-23 infra.
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This Article attempts to place the changes in the work
force into perspective by examining four alternatives to the hierarchical, bureaucratic model of traditional business organizations. The coarchical, collegial structure used by professionals,
as well as developments in industrial democracy, job enrichment, and worker codetermination will be examined. The Article describes how each alternative provides employees with a
greater voice in the operations of the economic entity than they
possess under the hierarchical model. Elaborating on the
problems currently confronting professional employees, the Article explores the institutional and legal environment in which
doctors and university professors work. Because the legal issues raised by the unionization efforts of professional employees involve definitions under the Act and judicial constructions
of covered employees and excluded managers and supervisors,
the statutory framework is analyzed. The Article explores the
legislative history of the 1935 Wagner Act and the 1947 TaftHartley amendments and demonstrates that the Supreme
Court's exclusion of all managerial employees from the coverage of the Act is inconsistent with that history. Finally, the Article discusses the Board's attempt to reconcile the tension
inherent in the Act's definitions of included and excluded employees with the reality of a professional employee's role in the
work force. The Article suggests that the Board's independent
professional judgment test is the appropriate resolution to this
tension. The Article concludes by criticizing the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva University'8 for its refusal
to recognize that professional employees do not assume excluded supervisory or managerial functions when they exercise
their independent professional judgment.

II. COARCHICAL, COLLEGIAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIERARCHICAL, BUREAUCRATIC MODEL
American business and labor laws are based on the hierarchical, bureaucratic model of business organizations which prevailed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As Berle and
Means noted fifty years ago,19 this model fails to describe the
actual divisions of power and interests within modern business
entities. It is therefore questionable whether these laws, based
on an outmoded model, are responsive to the economy today.
18.

444 U.S. 672 (1980).

19. See A. BERLE & G.
PROPERTY 2-3 (1932).

MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
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Nevertheless, as John Meynard Keynes observed, "[p]ractical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct
20
economist."
The historical model consists of a tripartite division of
functions between capital, management, and labor.21 The
model is basically adversarial, with the owners' and managers'
interests inherently at odds with those of the workers. 22 Authority is delegated by the owners to the managers and supervisors, who in turn run the business. Consistent with this
hierarchical, bureaucratic model, management theory advocated the parsing of work into its simplest components. According to Frederick Taylor's theory of "scientific
management," 23 managers, as the agents of the shareholders,
had the right to control the enterprise and determine what
work should be done and who should do it. Under this scheme,
management could employ unskilled labor, and could readily
interchange or replace workers as it deemed necessary.
Modern labor laws continue to reflect the outmoded business and management models. The law allows rank and file
workers to unionize, but precludes supervisory and managerial
employees from unionizing. Although workers have a right to
bargain collectively over their own wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment, collective bargaining does not reach
questions concerning the organization of the enterprise, what it
should produce, and how it should produce it. The system thus
draws clear adversarial lines between the supervisory and
managerial employees and the rank and file employees.
20.

J.

KEYNES, THE

GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT

INTEREST AND

MONEY 383 (1936).
21. Stockholders provide the capital to establish a business entity, and an
elected board of directors represents the stockholders' interest in receiving a
maximum investment return. The board of directors appoints the supervisorymanagerial group. With the interests of the stockholders as its motivating factor, the supervisory-managerial group runs the business, deciding what to produce and how. But see A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 19, at 119-25 (noting
that in practice, the interests of the stockholders and the supervisory-managerial group are different and often conflicting). The third group in the enterprise, labor, is composed of workers who are told what to do and how to do it
by managers and supervisors. Labor's sole function is to produce goods.
22. Because the model is based on the assumption that the stockholders
desire the maximum amount of work from the employees at the lowest possible
wages and employees wish to do the minimum amount of work for the highest
possible wages, conflict is inevitable.
23. See generally F. TAYLOR, SCIENTFC MANAGEMENT (1947) (comprising
Shop Management (rev. ed. 1911); The Principles of Scientific Management
(1911); Taylor's Testimony Before the Special House Committee (1912)).
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In contrast to, and existing concurrently with the above hierarchical, bureaucratic model, there were two counter-models:
professionalism and industrial democracy. In recent years,
management consultants have developed a third model, job enrichment. Finally, a fourth model, worker codetermination, predominates in the industrial nations of western Europe.
A.

PROFESSIONALISM

Professionals and skilled craft workers 24 historically organized themselves differently from the hierarchical model described above. After selection by older members of their
profession or craft and a period of extensive, specialized training, decisions regarding their competence were made by these
same people. Once found fully competent, professionals or
craft workers could operate autonomously. Notwithstanding
their status as self-employed individual entrepreneurs, professionals and craft workers operated in a collective fashion.
Their selection, training, certification, and work occurred within
the framework of collective entities that took the form of associations established to develop and preserve proper stan25
dards for the practice of the profession or craft.

24. Although professionals and craft workers share many values and methods of operating, there are important differences. Whereas the craft worker operated according to custom, often proceeding by trial and error, the
professional mastered and applied a systematic and often esoteric body of abstract knowledge. B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 86-88
(1976).
As Bledstein observes:
The craftsman traditionally handled a series of individual objects, according to the custom of his work, varying his own specific practices by
trial and error. The professional excavated nature for its principles, its
theoretical rules, thus transcending mechanical procedures, individual
cases, miscellaneous facts, technical information, and instrumental
applications.
Id. at 88.
25. For a description of the actual mode of operation of skilled craft workers and a discussion of the first "strike" in the United States, that of the Philadelphia Cordwainers' Association, see Nelles, The FirstAmerican Labor Case,
41 YALE L.J. 165 (1931).
There are three ways wages and conditions of employed workers can be established: they can be unilaterally established by the employer they can be
unilaterally established by the employees; or they can be bilaterally established. In the United States, collective bargaining is the primary bilateral
method of establishing conditions of employment. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATIsTIcs, DEP'T. OF LABOR, Bum.. No. 2079, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIoNs
AND EMPLOYEE AsSOCIATONs 56, 66 (1979).
The second method, unilateral establishment by the employees, was the
normal mode used by most workers' organizations until the 20th century.
Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 663, 726 (1973). This method was used by the Cordwainers' Association.
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Professional associations, such as the American Medical
Association (AMA),26 the American Bar Association (ABA),27

and the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP),28 first came into formal existence during the 19th and
early 20th centuries. 2 9 The associations were originally geared
to members who were independent entrepreneurs, not to professionals who were salaried employees. These associations,
although not labeled unions, established a monopolyO for their
members by limiting entry into and practice of their respective
professions, and engaged in price fixing by setting and enforcing recommended fee schedules. They justified their operations on the ground that only members of the profession could
set appropriate standards; laypersons such as consumers or
government officials could not. A theory of objective right supported the exclusive retention of control by fully certified mem3
bers of the profession. 1
Beginning in the 19th century and continuing into the 20th
century, the universities became the focal point of professionalism. Licensure after achievement of a university degree became the norm for most professions. 32 The universities thus
became the depositories of collective wisdom and the road to
status and economic security in American society. The profes[They] did not attempt to negotiate wage scale agreements with employers. Instead, they met with each other in secret societies, determined an appropriate "bill of prices," and agreed that none would work
for any employer who did not recognize the scale thus unilaterally
adopted. The rules adopted by these early labor organizations included not only fairly complex schedules of piece work rates, but also
regulations governing such matters as security of employment, apprenticeship rules, rotation of available work, and, of course, the closed
shop. Those who worked contrary to the rules were fined.
Id. at 725 (footnotes omitted). It is still a method used effectively by some labor organizations, notably those representing skilled craft and professional employees. Id. at 726-27.
26. The AMA was founded in 1847. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 820
(15th ed. 1980).
27. The ABA was organized in 1878. Id. at 317.
28. The AAUP was established in 1915. Id. at 529.
29. See B. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 80-92.
30. For a discussion of the history, structure, purposes, activities, and success of the AMA as a professional trade association, see Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politicsin OrganizedMedicine,
63 YALE L.J. 938 (1954). For a description and discussion of the ABA and the
American Association of Law Schools (AALS), the two most powerful trade associations in the legal profession, see First, Competition in the Legal Education
Industry, (pts. I & II), 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311 (1978), 54 N.Y.U. L REv. 1049 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as First (when referring to both articles), First, Legal Education I, and First, Legal Education II].
31. B. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 90.
32. Id. at 297.
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sional associations, however, gained control through accreditation standards dealing with entry into and graduation from the
professional schools, and retained control through licensure
standards regarding entry into and continuing membership in
33
the profession.
The universities themselves, modeled on the medieval colleges, usually operated as collective professional entities. As
Judge Cardozo observed in 1925, "[b]y practice, and tradition,
the members of the faculty are masters, and not servants ....
They have the independence appropriate to a company of
scholars."3 4 Nevertheless, from the earliest times in America,
the actual power collectively exercised by the professoriat did
not totally conform to legal norms. Chief Justice Marshall's
1819 description of the powers of the trustees of Dartmouth
College demonstrates that a lay board of trustees has always
retained final and total authority to govern American colleges
35
and universities.
By the late 19th century, professionalism clearly meant
more than status, prestige, and money. One commentator recently observed:
Professionalism was also a culture which embodied a more radical idea
of democracy than even the Jacksonian had dared to dream. The culture of professionalism emancipated the active ego of a sovereign person as he performed organized activities within comprehensive spaces.
The culture of professionalism incarnated the radical idea of the independent democrat, a liberated person seeking to free the power of
nature within every worldly sphere, a self-governing individual exercising his trained judgment in an open society. The Mid-Victorian as [a]
professional person strove to achieve a level of autonomous individualism, a position
of unchallenged authority heretofore unknown in Amer36
ican life.

Ever increasing groups of people wanted the status, prestige,
money, and perceived autonomous individualism associated
with professionalism. Because a university education was the
prerequisite to professionalism in American society, as the uni33. See generally sources cited in note 30 supra.
There is currently a heated debate regarding proposals to accredit foreign
medical schools. The Association of American Medical Colleges is opposed to
such accreditation because it would downgrade the quality of medical care.
Proponents believe it is a means of increasing the available pool of doctors.
See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1981, § B at 10, col. 3.
34. Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 240 N.Y. 328, 336-37, 148 N.E. 539, 541 (1925).
For a discussion of Hamburger, see note 123 infra.
35. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 632 (1819).
36. B. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 87-88. See also Ross, Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement in Advanced Industrial Society, 50 VA. L. REV.
1359, 1377 (1964).
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versities were opened up to a more diverse population, more
people were capable of fulfilling their ambitions.
Professionalism is now a key factor in the entire work
force,3 7 and the rhetoric and theoretical independence of professionalism appeals to growing numbers of workers. The
group to whom the title "professional" applies has expanded
from the traditional areas of law and medicine to engineering
and management. It has expanded from true professionals to
include related craft groups and ever increasing groups of bluecollar workers.3 8 Furthermore, many previously self-employed
professionals have become employees of large organizations.
They make up a large percentage of the employees of nonprofit
organizations, such as hospitals and private universities, sectors of our economy that have undergone astonishing growth in
the last thirty years. 3 9
While professionals were changing from independent, autonomous entrepreneurs to employees of nonprofit organizations, the administrative structure of these nonprofit entities
was also changing. Traditionally the members of the profession
ran the nonprofits: doctors ran the hospitals; professors ran the
universities. Professional administrators and bureaucrats,
however, have increasingly gained administrative control of
these economic entities. The new prominence of professional
administrators may engender conflicts among professional employees regarding the mission of their institutions. Traditional
professionals and administrators who rose from their ranks are
primarily concerned with maintaining the quality of professional services. The new professional administrators are more
willing to balance quality against competing economic factors.
With final authority resting in a lay board of trustees, the tradi40
tional professionals are increasingly meeting opposition.
The rhetoric of professionalism is now being used against
37. See Ross, supra note 36, at 1364-65.
38. Id. at 1364. The American system of free, compulsory public education
has resulted in a highly literate public. Extensive networks of public communications, including television, radio, and newspapers, have exposed the public to
current social, political, and economic issues and have created a society of relatively well informed individuals. The democratic political system, based on
"one man, one vote," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), has created citizens
who believe their opinions are worthy of consideration. Many blue-collar work-

ers, however, are still employed in nonresponsible, nonimaginative, predetermined, confined work roles. Professionals are increasingly finding that they are
losing their traditional prerogatives.
39. Hansmann, supra note 10, at 835 n.1.
40. For a discussion of these conflicts in the area of higher education, see
notes 121-35 infra and accompanying text.
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the traditional professionals.4 1 Professional administrators and
bureaucrats with degrees in business administration claim
greater expertise than university professors to run universities,
and those with degrees in hospital administration claim greater
expertise than doctors to run hospitals. 42
The law has failed to keep pace with these developments.
In the early years of its existence, the NLRB was faced with
few cases involving professional employees. Two factors account for the paucity of these cases: the traditional industrial
43
sector of the economy employed relatively few professionals,
and those professionals who were employees generally did not
accept unionization as an appropriate form of collective activity
it
for themselves. 4 4 In the few cases the Board did decide, 45
readily found that professionals were covered employees.
Not until the 1960s and 1970s did a substantial number of cases
challenge basic assumptions about the employment relation41. The rhetoric of professionalism viewed professionals as the elite, above
the need for the type of collective action allowed by labor laws. That rhetoric
kept many white-collar and professional employees from seeking the protection
of the labor laws. Unionization became attractive only when economic conditions worsened and when loss of status became obvious. The need for collective action by professionals can result from either economics or loss of control.
The loss of control can involve either traditional labor issues, such as hours and
terms and conditions of employment, or professional issues concerning the
quality of performance and product. Economics and lack of control over hours
and terms and conditions of employment are reasons why any employee would
seek collective strength in unionization. Lack of control over quality, however,
has a uniquely professional aspect.
It seems inconsistent when professionals seek to organize collectively to
maintain their individual autonomy. Some persons may argue that collective
organizations would allow those at the lower rung to gain greater power over
the decisions of the group or that they would lead to mediocrity. It could be
argued that collective action through professional associations did not allow
this, because the associations purportedly honored quality, expertise and merit
above all. In reality, however, the associations used these standards to exclude
women, blacks, and other minority groups, building biases into the professional
association system. See notes 139-41 infra and accompanying text.
42. The number of Master's degrees in business increased from 5,303 in
1962, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

OF THE UNITED STATES, 137 (85th ed. 1964), to 46,545 in 1977, STATISTICAL AB-

STRACT, supra note 7, at 283.
43. See generally Ross, supra note 36.
44. Id.
45. In Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1494 (1944), the Board stated that
"we shall adhere to our customary practice, finding that the interests of the employees involved herein can best be served by representation within separate
units, one consisting of office and clerical employees, and the other of technical
and professional workers." See, e.g., Air Line Pilot's Ass'n, 97 N.L.R.B. 929
(1951) (lawyers); Standard Oil Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1948) (nurses); Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948) (lawyers); American Steel & Wire,
58 N.L.R.B. 253 (1944) (nurses); Hudson Motor Car Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 55 (1942)
(nurses).

PROFESSIONALS AND UNIONIZATION

1982]

ship and NLRA coverage of professionals. 46
Because many professionals are uncertain of their own status, this legal response is not surprising. Many professionals
refrain from enthusiastically embracing a trade union model
because notions of the old professionalism create the misconception that unions are for nonprofessional, blue-collar, uneducated employees. Ironically, although professional employees
need collective action now more than at any other time, their
traditional form of collective action through trade associations
has been limited. Not only have court antitrust decisions curtailed the power of professional associations to restrict membership and fix fees, 47 but society now questions whether
professionals alone have the ability to judge the quality of their
services.4
Professionals seeking to convert their trade associations to
labor unions face additional problems. The AAUP is a classic
example. As it changed from a pure professional association to
a labor union, its moral influence decreased. 49 Academic sanctions such as censure had little effect after others perceived the
AAUP as merely another labor union. 50

B. INDusTRIAL DEMOCRACY
Since the early days of the American republic, industrial
democracy has represented an alternative to the bureaucratic,
hierarchical model.5 1 The oldest American reference to industrial democracy is attributed to Albert Gallatin, Secretary of
the Treasury under Presidents Jefferson and Madison, who in
1797 stated that "the democratic principle on which this nation
was founded should not be restricted to the political process
46. See notes 304-414 infra and accompanying text.

47. See notes 165-69 infra and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of increased public control of the medical profession,
see R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 529 (1971) and

the sources cited in the notes therein. For a similar study of the legal profession, see Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90

HARv. L. REV. 702 (1977). In our colleges and universities even students have
"insisted upon and received a voice in decisions regarding admissions, curriculum and faculty." Kirp, Collective Bargainingin Education: Professionalsas a

PoliticalInterest Group, 21 J. PUB. L. 323, 333 (1972).
49. See, e.g., Kadish, The Strike and the Professoriate,54 AAUP BU=LTiN
160, 164 (1968).

50. See id. at 165.
51.

M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965

(1970). See also Summers, IndustrialDemocracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 29 (1979) (summarizes and comments on Derber's
work).
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52
but should be applied to the industrial operation as well." Industrial democracy may take the form of ownership of the economic enterprise by the employees themselves. Cooperatives
have existed for many years in American industry. The first
major American labor union, the Knights of Labor, advocated
the widespread establishment of cooperatives in the nineteenth
53
century.
In the 1930s, however, American labor attempted to establish industrial democracy through collective bargaining. Senator Wagner, the author of the 1935 National Labor Relations
Act, used terms reminiscent of Gallatin to justify the requirement that employers recognize and bargain with the representatives of the majority of their employees: "[D]emocracy in
industry must be based upon the same principles as democracy
in government. Majority rule, with all its imperfections, is the
best protection of workers' rights, just as it is the surest guar54
anty of political liberty that mankind has yet discovered."
Congress decided that employee participation in industrial life
would take place within a model of worker-owner negotiations
regarding those issues which directly concern employees:
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.5 5 Furthermore, these negotiations would take place on a companyby-company basis. Congress then implicitly rejected large
scale governmental regulation of wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment, along with direct governmental or
worker ownership. Unfortunately, the scheme of industrial democracy envisioned by Senator Wagner has not been realized.
Collective bargaining agreements do not cover seventy percent
of the American work force. 5 6 Furthermore, covered employees
have limited protection under the labor laws due to the narrow
57
scope given to mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Some trends indicate major changes in the actual operation, as opposed to the formal organization, of American businesses. In many companies, an increasingly large portion of
stock is either owned by the employees themselves under employee stock purchase plans or by labor union pension plans.58

52. M. DERBER, supra note 51, at 6.
53. Id. at 46.
54. 79 CoNG. REC. 7571 (1935), reprinted in M. DERBER, supra note 51, at

321.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See notes 268-72 infra and accompanying text.
Summers, supra note 51, at 36.
See notes 266-72 infra and accompanying text.
See sources cited in notes 88-89 infra.
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In addition, although union representation on the Chrysler
board is unique, many commentators have advocated greater
employee participation on the boards of directors of traditional
industrial sector companies. 5 9
These developments represent a shift from the traditional
model of directors and managers who represent only shareholders desiring a maximum return on the capital they contribute to a corporate enterprise. Now directors may also
represent the interests of employees and consumers. As employee interests are directly represented on the top governing
body of an enterprise, the adversarial relations between the
employer and the employees will likely decrease.
C.

JOB ENIcHMENT
In both the United States and in other industrial nations,

large, hierarchical, bureaucratic entities have generally replaced small, individual entities. This is true of public and private businesses as well as other organizations. 60 As a result,
the individual worker feels unable to control his or her job or
work environment. 61 In the past, this has caused alienation
and apathy.6 2 Recent attempts to gain control of larger entities
63
indicate a movement to assert control over one's existence.
Because most workers are no longer self-employed, they seek
59. Employees of a corporation are an easily identifiable group having a
strong interest in the operation of a corporation. In recognition of the impact
corporate decisions have on consumers, public directors have also been appointed to corporate boards. See Blumberg, Reflections on Proposalsfor Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Directors:
"Special Interest" or "Public Directors," 53 B.U. L. REv. 547 (1973); Bonanno,
Employee Codetermination; Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe,
and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARv. J. LEG. 947 (1977); Grossfeld &
Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation:A Comparative View of Corporate
Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L 397 (1978); Vagts,
Reforming the "Modern" Corporation; Perspectivesfrom the German, 80 HARv.
L. REV. 23 (1966).
There is also a trend toward the election of employees to public boards and
to the boards of private nonprofit corporations. The election of school teachers
to school boards is an example. In New York City, Albert Schanker's union,
The United Federation of Teachers, has for many years run successful teacher
slates in local school board elections. Chambers, Political Sway of Teachers
Union Now Pervasive in Most Districts,N.Y. Times, June 26, 1980, § A, at 1, col
1.
60. See generally Grossfeld & Ebke, supra note 59.
61. See notes 69-76 infra and accompanying text.
62. For a discussion of the concept of "anomie," see R MERTON, SocIAL
THEORY AND SoCIAL STRUCTURE 185-248 (1968).

63. See notes 77-89 infra and accompanying text.
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identity and satisfaction within the structure of the employing
enterprise.
The theory of "scientific management," based on the idea
that it is the right of management to design and assign work to
rank and file employees and that such work should be broken
down to its simplest components so that workers can be easily
trained, interchanged, and replaced,6 4 has fallen into disrepute
with today's management experts.6 5 The emphasis today in
both the academic literature and at the workplace is on quality
of work life,66 which is described as the process an organization
uses "to unlock the creative potential of its people by involving
them in decisions affecting their work lives."67 The primary
method of achieving this goal is job enrichment. One commentator observed that "[i]f early Taylorism is likened to cracking
an eggshell into its smallest pieces, then job enrichment-the
process of redesigning jobs to provide a greater degree of employee responsibility-would be putting Humpty Dumpty together again."68 In seeking to enrich employees' jobs, modern
management therefore seeks to involve the worker in the most
basic policy decisions.
Professor Argyris, probably the most influential American
currently writing in the field of management, stated that the
purpose of his 1964 landmark study69 was to theorize "how organizations might be redesigned to take into account ... the
energies and competences that human beings have to offer." 70
According to Argyris, although the pyramidal structure of traditional organizations gives "the greatest influence over persons,
information and instrumentalities to the higher level positions," 71 all employees, even lower level employees, aspire to
psychological success. 72 Psychological success comes from individual responsibility, self-control, internal commitment to
64. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 76 infra.
66. Since 1965, more than 450 articles and books have been written on the
"quality of worklife" movement. See Guest, Quality of Worklife-Learning
from Tarreytourn, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1979, at 76. For a description of
how the concept of quality of worklife is actually integrated into the workplace,
see Walton, Work Innovations in the United States, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug.
1979, at 88-98.
67. Guest, supra note 66, at 76-77.
68. Scobel, New Directionsfor Labor-Management Cooperation,66 MGmT.
REV., Feb. 1977, at 17.
69.

C. ARGYRis, INTEGRATING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ORGANIZATION (1964).

70. Id. at viii.
71. Id. at 39.

72. Id. at 83-85.
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meaningful work, and full utilization of employees' abilities. 73
Argyris found alienation throughout the workplace due to the
absence of psychological success, 74 and suggested that these
problems could be reduced by giving rank and file workers
more influence within the organization.75 Such a coarchical
model has long existed among professionals and now forms the
76
basis for job enrichment for traditional blue-collar employees.
The major changes occurring thus far have been pragmatic,
nonideological changes instituted by management alone or by
management and labor together. These changes have not involved alterations in the ownership of the means of production. 77 In job enrichment, whether by team organization of
73. Id. at 39-40.
74. Id. at 65. Argyris points out that "employees are increasingly coupling
job satisfaction with alienation and withdrawal, and simply asking to be paid
fairly. Satisfaction and low productivity can become a new moral virtue." C.
ARGYRIS, ON ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FUTURE 24 (Professional Papers in Administrative and Policy Studies, No. 03-006) (1973).
75. C. ARGYRIS, supra note 69, at 169.
76. Argyris suggested in 1964
that the organization of the future will also strive to enlarge the jobs.
The enlargement will not tend to be limited to the "doing" or "motor"
abilities. It will include expanded use of the individual's intellectual
and interpersonal abilities. Wherever possible the jobs will be redesigned to include responsibility for larger and larger meaningful segments of the product and for its quality.
Id. at 274.
Other observers agree on the need to improve the quality of worklife. See,
e.g., P. WARR & T. WALu, WORK AND WELLBEING (1975); WORK AND THE QuALrY
OF LIFE (OToole ed. 1974); Davis, Enhancing the Quality of Working Life: Developments in the United States, 116 INT'L LAB. REV. 53 (1977); Guest, supra
note 66; Kuper, Developments in the Quality of Working Life, 28 LAB. L.J. 752
(1977). See generally C. GOLD, EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE COMMrEEs AND WORKER
PARTICPATION (1976); Strauss & Rosenstein, Workers Participation:A Critical
View, 9 INDuS. REL. 197 (1970); Symposium Workers Participationin Managemen4 An International Comparison, 18 INDus. REL. 247 (1979); Walton, supra
note 66, at 88. There are disagreements, however, regarding the rationale for requiring improvements in the quality of work life and the ways to implement
the necessary changes. Kuper, supra, at 752, 759-61; Scobel, supra note 68, at
14-18. At least three objectives underlay change in the work place: increased
productivity, increased worker satisfaction regardless of its affect on productivity, or fundamental change in the basic business structure by transferring ownership to the employees themselves.
77. Agyris argues that these problems are not unique to capitalist
economies:
We do not believe that the problems would be solved by changing
the ownership of the organizations .... Thus ownership does not
seem to be a crucial variable as long as the basic security and physiological needs are satisfied. Indeed, under these conditions we suggest
that those who require that the worker own the impoverished work
world in which he exists presently may well be adding insult to injury.... There is informal evidence available from studies in England, Poland, and Russia to show that the transfer of ownership of the
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work or by the establishment of joint labor-management committees, the particular job is expanded to include intellectual
input from each employee.7 8 In team organization of work, a
small group of employees may be given responsibility for design, production, quality control,7 9 and possibly even marketing. Labor-management committees, existing either within or
without a collective bargaining structure, provide a forum for
joint discussions and problem solving at the plant, department,
80
or unit levels.
Although increased worker satisfaction and increased productivity have followed changes in the American work environment, reorientation within the existing industrial and legal
framework has resulted in adjustment problems. Business
Week reported on an attempt to use job enrichment at one
plant of a traditional industrial enterprise:
The problem has been not so much that the workers could not manage
their own affairs as that some management and staff personnel saw
their own positions threatened because the workers performed almost
too well. One former employee says the system-built around a team
concept-came squarely up against the company's bureaucracy. Lawyers, fearing reaction from the National Labor Relations Board, opposed the idea of allowing team members to vote on pay raises.
Personnel managers objected because team members made hiring decisions. Engineers resented workers doing engineering work. 81

Such transitional problems are not unsolvable, however, given
the high degree of management and labor acceptance of job
enrichment. 82
The almost obsessive nature of American business's concern with Japanese management techniques demonstrates
organization from private to public has meant very little change in
terms of every-day problems faced by the people in the organizations.
C. ARGYRIS, supra note 69, at 276-77. Accord, Scobel, supra note 68, at 14.
78. See C. ARGYmIS, supra note 69, at 274.
79. See, e.g., Chrysler Union in Quality Role, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1980, at
35, coL 4.
80. K. FRIEDEN, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND PRODUCTIVrrY 31 (1980).
Scanion Plans, introduced in 1945, combine several job enrichment
techniques:
The Scanlon Plan utilizes a company-wide incentive system with
three basic elements: (1) teamwork, with a common objective of increasing output; (2) a suggestion system that channels cost-saving
ideas from the workforce through a labor-management committee
structure that evaluates and activates accepted suggestions; (3) a bonus system based on a formula that measures productivity gains and
establishes a procedure for sharing the gains equitably among the
workers.
Id. at 27.
81. Stonewalling Plant Democracy, Bus. WEEK, March 28, 1977, at 78.
82. Kovach, Sands & Books, Is Codeterminationa Workable Ideafor U.S.
Labor-ManagementRelations?, M.S.U. Bus. Topics, Winter 1980, at 49.
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management's acceptance of job enrichment. 83 Unlike the
traditional American hierarchical system of decision making,
Japanese industry is highly decentralized with lower level employees encouraged to participate in decisions relating to their
work.84 Employees at the lowest levels often recommend
changes; employees at each succeeding level review and agree
upon these changes.85 Although the process is slow in achiev.ing agreement, once agreement is reached implementation is
rapid because all those involved in implementing the change
86
have already achieved a consensus.
In addition to job enrichment innovations, basic changes
have occurred in the ownership structure of our traditional hierarchical, bureaucratic corporate enterprises. There are three
primary means of structural change. The first, a direct outgrowth of one type of industrial democracy in the United
States, is cooperative ownership of an enterprise. 87 Another
method is worker ownership through employee stock option
plans. Although top level managers have long received shares
of stock in addition to salaries, recently there has been recognition of plans allowing individual rank and fie employees to directly purchase stock 88 and of stock purchases by union
pension funds. 89 The final method includes employee representation on corporate boards. To understand this method of em83. See, e.g., Johnson & Ouchi, Made in America (Under JapaneseManagement), HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 61; Moran, Japanese Participative
Management-OrHow Rinji Seido Can Workfor You, SA.M. ADVANCED MGMT.
J., Summer 1979, at 14; Ozawa, Japanese World of Work: An InterpretiveStudy,
M.S.U. Bus. TopIcs, Spring 1980, at 45 (1980). See also Nisson to Export Production Methods to Tennessee, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1981, § A, at 1, coL 3; Transcript
of CBS Evening News with Dan Rather, Bruce Dunning Report on Japanese
Auto Industry (Apr. 30, 1981) (on ifie at the Minnesota Law Review).
84. See Moran, supra note 83, at 17-19.
85. See Johnson & Ouchi, supra note 83, at 65-66.
86. Id.
87. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the best known
study of worker-owned firms is of plywood companies in the Pacific Northwest.
C. BELLAS, INDusTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE WORKER-OWNED FJRM (1972).
See also Jones, U.S. Producer Cooperatives: The Record to Date, 18 INDus.
REL. 342 (1979); OToole, The Uneven Record of Employee Ownership, HARv.
Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 185; Russell, Hochner & Perry, Participation,Influence, and Worker-Ownership, 18 INDus. REL. 330 (1979).
88. SENATE SELECT COMM.ON SMLL BusiNEss, 96 CONG., 1ST SESS., THE
ROLE OF TE FEDERAL GovERNMENT AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHn OF Busnmss
(Comm. Print 1979).
89. "[S]ome analysts expect pension funds [will] hold more than 50% of
all common stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange [within a decade]."
Embattled Unions Strike Back at Management, Bus. WEEi, Dec. 4, 1978, at 63.
See also K. FRIEDEN, supra note 80 at 8; Bonanno, supra note 59, at 994.
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ployee participation it is best to examine it in its European
context.

D. EUROPEAN CODETERMINATION
The legal systems of continental Europe have considered
the relationship between employee and employer under both
their labor laws and their corporate laws.9 0 Since the German
system of codetermination has been the most influential in Europe, and the one most commented upon in the American literature, it will be used as a prototype.
Under German law, workers are entitled to representation
on a company's supervisory board or Aufsichtsrat.9 ' The representation is substantial, essentially giving workers parity with
shareholders in companies in the coal, iron, and steel industries employing more than 1,000 workers, and in other firms
with a work force of more than 2,000.92 Representation equals
one-third of the board in companies employing fewer than 2,000
workers. 93 The supervisory board has the power "to appoint
and supervise the managing board [Vorstand] and to make major decisions concerning the goals and objectives of the firm."94
Thus, substantial worker representation on supervisory boards
gives German workers the control over the destiny of their
firms and their lives that management often denies to the majority of American workers.

German law also entitles workers to substantial participation in the operations of their employer at the local or plant
level. 95 Each firm employing more than five workers must have
a works council composed of employee representatives who
have an equal voice with management in deciding issues such
as wage structure, work schedules, staffing policies, training,
90. See A. CAREW, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN TRADE
UNioNs passim (1976); Beal, Origins of Codetermination,8 INDus. & LAB. REL.
REV. 483, 484-85 (1955); Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Laws, 84 HAv. L. REV. 1394, 1417-19 (1971); Summers, supra note 9;
Comment, Codeterminationin West Germany, 51 OR.L. REV. 214, 215 (1971).
91. Comment, supra note 90, at 215-16.
92. Kovach, Sands & Books, supra note 82, at 52.
93. Id. at 52.
94. Id.; Schoenbaum & Lieser, Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation " The 'Two-Tier'BoardModel, 62 Ky. L.J. 91, 101 (1973). Employee representation on supervisory boards and works councils includes not only bluecollar workers but also white-collar and professional employees. Wiedemann,
Codeterminationby Workers in German Enterprise,28 AM. J. ComP. L 79, 79-81
(1980). See also Beal, supra note 90, at 485.
95. Schoenbaum & Lieser, supra note 94, at 109-10.
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hiring, firing, and promotion.9 6 Because workers and their representatives possess great power at both the local and corporate levels, one might ask what negotiation is left for a labor
union. Collective bargaining takes place largely at the industry
level between large national unions and multi-employer associations 97 and seldom includes more than the setting of minimum wage rates. 98 Works councils resolve the specifics at the
plant level. 99
In addition to their tremendous power at the plant and enterprise level, German workers also exert greater political
power than American workers.oO Strong and often dominant
labor parties throughout Europe'01 have enacted legal protections, such as prohibitions against unjust dismissals. Most
American workers, however, receive such protections only if
they are members of a labor union which has managed to in02
clude such protections in a collective bargaining agreement.1
Commentators note that the successful functioning of the
German system of codetermination depends on a substantially
different view of the relationship between workers and employers than that prevalent in America-the German system depends on a spirit of cooperation between labor and management rather than an adversary relationship. 0 3 In return for
labor's substantial contribution to basic corporate policy and to
the total plant operations, it must be willing to work with the
representatives of the company and to accept responsibility for
decisions. 04 European workers have accepted this responsibil96. Kovach, Sands &Books, supra note 82, at 51. See also Summers, supra
note 9, for a description of worker representation at four levels of German life:
government, industry, enterprise, and plant.
97. Kovach, Sands & Books, supra note 82, at 51.
98. Id.; Schoenbaum & Lieser, supra note 94, at 116; Summers, supra note
9, at 380.
99. Bok, supra note 90, at 1406-11.
100. Summers, supra note 9, at 369.
101. Bok, supra note 90, at 1414-15.
102. See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 481-50 (1976). See also Blades, Employment at
Will vs. Individual Freedom: on Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 CoLum. L REv. 1404, 1410-13 (1967); Bok, supra note 90, at 1418-23;
Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHio ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979).
103. See Murphy, Workers on the Board; Borrowing a European Idea, 27
LAB. L.J. 751, 752-53 (1976); Simitis, Worker's Participationin the EnterpriseTranscending Company Law?, 38 Mon. L. REv. 1, 19-21 (1975); Summers, supra
note 9, at 383.
104. Generally, American labor leaders have not been willing to do so.
Bonanno, supra note 59, at 998-99; Summers, supra note 9, at 369-71; Vagts,
supra note 59, at 77.
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ity, thus enabling the Germans to keep the number of hours
lost through strike activity at an extremely low level despite
major dislocations in German industry requiring the creation of
new jobs and massive retraining.105
In contrast to the European system of codetermination,
America in the 1930s adopted a system of collective bargaining.
One writer noted, however, that "[w]hile collective bargaining
is undoubtedly itself a form of codetermination, it is a form
which is reactive and adversarial rather than participatory and
cooperative."' 06 Under the American system of collective bargaining, employee codetermination reaches only a limited
number of issues concerning wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. As originally envisioned, collective bargaining would have allowed American workers and industry to
reach pragmatic solutions to problems of the workplace with a
minimum of governmental intervention. 0 7 This has not occurred; only thirty percent of our workforce participates in
codetermination through collective bargaining. 08
Two of the leading American writers in the field of labor
law, Derek Bok and Clyde Summers, reached similar conclusions regarding the reasons why American employees have not
achieved the same degree of control over their work lives as
their European counterparts. 09 They observe that American
society emphasizes notions of classlessness, individual initiative, and opportunity.110 American workers accordingly do not
perceive themselves as members of a lower working class oppressed by an elite ownership class. They adopt instead a middle class model and seek to improve their positions within an
enterprise on an individual basis."' Many workers reject the
labor movement and collective action within a labor union context as a lower class phenomenon. Moreover, labor representation evolved differently in the United States and Europe. At
the turn of the century, informal systems of joint worker-management committees developed in both societies." 2 After the
105. Bonanno, supra note 59, at 960. See also Vagts, supra note 59, at 70-71;
Simitis, supra note 103, at 20-21.
106. Bonanno, supra note 59, at 988.
107. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Ac; 1947, 61
HA v. L. REV. 1, 1 (1947).
108. Summers, supra note 9, at 377. See Kistler, Trends in Union Growth, 8
LAB. L.J. 539, 539-40 (1970). See generally Bok, supra note 90.
109. Bok, supra note 90; Summers, supra note 9.
110. Bok, supra note 90, at 1403. See also Summers, supra note 9, at 379.
111. Bok, supra note 90, at 1400-04.
112. C. GoLD,supra note 76, at 15-19.
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First World War these arrangements were supported by legislation in Europe, but stifled in the United States under the 1935
Wagner Act's prohibition against company unions." 3 Finally,
employers in the United States have historically resisted collective action by employees," 4 and this resistance appears to be
increasing." 5 Thus, these factors led to laws establishing decentralized and adversarial labor relations in the United States.
III. PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES AND
THE WORKPLACE
Congress's first attempt at comprehensive labor legislation,
the 1935 Wagner Act, did not mention professionals, managers,
or supervisors. Congress apparently gave little, if any, consideration to the Act's application to such employees or to workers
operating in nontraditional, nonhierarchical structures. Moreover, problems involving professional employees did not arise,
probably because most of them were not employed within the
industrial labor force. Indeed, the few early cases dealing with
professionals who wished to unionize under the Wagner Act
6
treated them as employees."
A large number of professionals have entered the work
force since the Second World War as employees of both traditional industrial sector companies and nonprofit institutions,
particularly hospitals and universities." 7 An examination of
hospitals and universities illustrates the problems these employees face." 8
113. Bok, supra note 90, at 1434-35; Summers, supra note 9, at 374-76; National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 8(2), 49 Stat. 452.
114. Bok, supra note 90, at 1409-11; Summers, supra note 9, at 376.
115. See, e.g., Wortman & Jones, Remedial Actions of the NLRB in Representation Cases, 30 LAB. LJ. 281, 282 (1979).
Between 1969 and 1979, the number of unfair labor practice charges filed
with the NLRB more than doubled. 41 NLRB ANN. REP. 22 (1979). The great
bulk of these charges were filed by unions, not employers. Id. at 266-67. A comparison of the percentage of filings of unfair labor practice cases for the years
1936 through 1979 shows that unfair labor practice charges have reached the
1936 level when employer resistance was at its peak. Id. at 23. The percentage
of filings of representation cases was highest in 1945 and has been gradually decreasing to the 1936 level Id. at 23. There is, however, increased interest in instituting decertification proceedings. See Krupman & Rasin, Decertification:
Removing the Shroud, 30 LAB. L.J. 231 (1979).
116. See cases cited in note 45 supra.
117. See note 7 supra.
118. Although the Article focuses on professors and doctors, other groups of
professionals are facing similar problems. See generally Arian, Some Problems
of Collective Bargainingin Symphony Orchestras,22 LAB. LJ. 676 (1971); Fraser & Goldenberg, Collective Bargainingfor Professional Workers: The Case of
the Engineeers, 20 McGmH L J. 456 (1974); Roberts -&Powers, Defining the Rela-
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COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

Colleges and universities currently confront severe fiscal
problems largely caused by the end of the post-World War II
baby boom." 9 During the late 1950s and 1960s, colleges and
universities experienced a tremendous expansion in the size of
student body, faculty, and administration. The expansion
started in the schools of education which trained elementary
and high school teachers to teach the "babies" while they were
young; it occurred next in the graduate schools training college
professors for the same "babies" when they went to college; it
also occurred in the colleges the "babies" attended when they
graduated from high school. At the end of the baby boom enrollment dropped substantially in the schools of education, the
graduate schools, and the colleges of arts and sciences. In response to significantly diminishing university revenues, colleges and universities have reduced or completely denied
tionship Between Antitrust Law and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the
CurrentLegal Battleground, 19 WM. &MARY L. REV. 395 (1978); Stavitsky, Lawyer Unionization in Quasi-Governmental Public and Private Sectors, 17 CAL.
W. L. REV. 55 (1980); Note, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The Professional-Managerial Overlap, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 681 (1981) (symphony orchestras); Note,
ProfessionalSports and the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption to FederalAntitrust Law: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 11 U. TOL. L. REV. 633 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ProfessionalSports]; Comment, "ManagerialEmployee".
A Label in Search of a Meaningful Definition, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 441 (lawyers), 443 (engineers), 452 (editorial and broadcasting employees) (1979) [hereinafter cited as Managerial Employee]; Comment, The Unionization of
Attorneys, 71 CoLum. L. REV. 100 (1971).
119. A child born in 1948 would normally have attended kindergarten and
elementary school from 1953 to 1962, high school from 1962 to 1966, and college
from 1966 to 1970. See J. WEISBERGER, FACULTY GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION: LIVING WrrH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Institute of Public
Employment Monograph No. 5, 1976); Arenson, Colleges Find That Adult Market Brings Risks As Well As Rewards, N.Y. Times, September 9, 1979, § 12, at 1,
col. 4, Maeroff, In College, Education With A Big Union Label, N.Y. Times, June
24, 1979, § E, at 8, col. 1.
For a general review of unionization in colleges and universities, see R.
CARR & D. VAN EYCE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO THE CAMPUS (1973);
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

IN HIGHER EDUCATION-THE

DEVELOPING LAw

(J.

Vladeck & S. Vladeck eds. 1975); COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND HIGHER EDUCATION: A READER (C. Hughes, R. Underbrink, & C. Gordon eds. 1973); H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (1973); FACULTY
BARGAINING IN THE SEVENTIES (T. Tice ed. 1973); F. KEMERER &J. BALDRMGE,
UNIONS ON CAMPUS (1975); E. LADD & S. LIPSET, PROFESSORS, UNIONS, AND
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1973); Brown, Collective Bargainingin Higher
Education, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1067 (1969); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policy Making Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L REV.
63 (1973); Sensenbrenner, Collective BargainingLegislationfor Public Higher
Educationfrom the Management Side of the Table, 4 J. COL. & U.L. 27 (1976).
See generally Collective Negotiations in HigherEducation: A Symposium, 1971
WIS. L. REV. 1.
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salary increases to faculty, curtailed the hiring of new faculty,
postponed promotions, denied tenure, and fired some tenured
faculty.120
The prominent role of nonfaculty administrators in mandating retrenchment is also a recent development. Until the
late 1950s and early 1960s, the professoriat had primary control
over institutions of higher education.121 Although lay members
of a board of trustees retained final legal authority over all matters within the university,122 their authority was often hidden
during the boom period since few issues arose to challenge the
mythology of an independent professoriat controlling its own
destiny on the basis of objective standards.123 Academic deci120. For a discussion of the baby boom and its effect on colleges and universities, see Garbarino, Emergence of Collective Bargaining,in FACULTY UNIONS
AND COLLECTVE BARGAINING 7-9 (E. Duryea, R. Fisk, et al. eds. 1973).
121. Colleges and universities originated in the Middle Ages as self-contained units, controlled almost exclusively by the professors. University professors are unique because they are the only large professional group that has
always operated within a corporate structure. The professoriat needed the university to practice its profession. One observer relates the degree of control,
and even arrogance, exercised by the medieval professoriat in the history of a
murder case at Oxford University:.
In 1209, the faculty at Oxford-together with the students-put on
an epic demonstration of power. The issue was not pay but prerogative: namely, in the relations between town and gown, who was the
boss? Some typically unruly scholars had killed a townswoman. The
town retaliated by seizing and executing two scholars. The university-both masters and scholars-countered with a suspendium clericorum, a cessation of classes and a relocation to other places,
including Cambridge. In 1214, the Pope himself intervened and ordered the town to do penance: barefoot they had to parade to the
graves of the executed scholars and rebury them in a cemetery; they
had to distribute forty-two shillings to poor scholars every year; they
had to make a feast for one hundred poor scholars every St. Nick's
Day; they had to freeze their rents for twenty years and then remit one
half the rent for the first ten years. Finally, the masters who "scabbed"
were suspended from teaching for three years.
Tyler, The Faculty Joins the Proletariat, in CoLLEcTrVE NEGOTIATIONS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION: A READER 32-33 (C. Hughes, R. Underbrink & C. Gordon
eds. 1973). Tyler stated: "The reason the professors are so late [in unionizing]
is that in a true sense they were the first." Id. at 31. Many students and professors during the college disturbances of the late 1960s also displayed a disregard
for civil authority. See, e.g., FACT-FINDING COMMISSION ON COLUMBIA DISTURBANCES, CRISIS AT COLUMBIA (1968).
122. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.

123. The extent to which this mythology prevails today is apparent from the
persistent quotation of Judge Cardozo's "company of scholars" language in
Hamburgerv. Cornell Univ. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 698 (2d Cir. 1978); McHugh, Collective
Bargainingwith Professionalsin Higher Education: Problems in Unit Determinations, 1971 WIs. L. REv. 55, 70.
Because authorities rely heavily on Cardozo, it is important to note the
context of his statement. Hamburgerwas a tort suit against Cornell University
by a student injured in a chemistry lab explosion. The main issue was the "ex-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:383

sions were made by the professors at the department, school,
and university senate levels. During the baby boom, institutions of higher education grew from small nonprofit entities
into major institutions. 124 This expansion created a need for in25
creased administration and for greater central control.1 Altent of the defendant's immunity as a charitable institution." 240 N.Y. at 331,
148 N.E. at 539. Judge Cardozo based his decision finding no liability on the
part of the university, on the traditional view of hospitals and colleges as small,
local, nonprofit, "charitable" institutions, with immunities not shared by institutions organized for profit. Id. at 335-36, 148 N.E. at 541.
The law applicable to tort suits against hospitals and universities in 1925 is
not the law today. Cardozo established the doctrine of a hospital's nonliability
for the negligent medical acts of its employee physicians in Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), a case he cited and relied
upon in Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 240 N.Y. at 335-36, 148 N.E. at 541.
Schloendorff was overruled by the New York Court of Appeals in Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 12 (1957), where the
court rejected Cardozo's concept that all of a hospital's "professional personnel,
such as doctors, nurses and interns, should be deemed independent contractors, though salaried employees [as] inconsistent with what they have been
held to be in every other context." 2 N.Y.2d at 663-64, 143 N.E.2d at 6-7, 163
N.Y.S.2d at 9. It noted that "today's hospital is quite different from its predecessor of long ago; it receives wide community support, employs a large
number of people and necessarily operates its plant in businesslike fashion,"
id. at 664, 143 N.E.2d at 7, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 9, and that there had been widespread
rejection by the courts of the immunity rule. Id. at 665, 143 N.E.2d at 7, 163
N.Y.S.2d at 9-10. Hospitals are regularly held liable for the negligence of doctors who are their employees, see Zaremski & Spitz, Liability of a Hospital as
an Institution: Are the Walls of Jericho Tumbling?, 16 FORUM 225, 227-29 (1980),
and, increasingly, even for the negligence of those who are not. Id. at 236-40.
The members of the professoriat themselves demonstrate a degree of
schizophrenia regarding their status as masters or servants. The mythology of
an independent professoriat satisfies their egos, but current realities have created problems.
The relationship between the professor and his college or university
has varied greatly from time to time and place to place and has never
been easy to define. He is at the same time a practitioner of a profession, an employee of an organization, and a manager who helps set and
administer the organization's policies and programs. This threefold
status is largely a pragmatic condition; it has never received a widely
accepted rationalization. Thus, in their roles as professionals and managers, faculty members assert, particularly in times of crisis at their institutions, "We are the university." At the same time they also speak
of themselves as "hired" by their institutions and readily condemn
"the administration" for treating them badly.
R. CARR & D. VAN EycK, supra note 119, at 263. See, e.g., Brown, Professorsand
Unions: The Faculty Senate: An Effective Alternative to Collective Bargaining
in Higher Education?, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 252, 266 (1970).
124. Colleges and universities in the United States actually enjoyed a
growth period for over 100 years. M. Ross, THE UNrvERsrry: THE ANATOMY OF
AcADEME 48 (1976). There was "a tenfold expansion of enrollments between
the years 1900 and 1950." Id. at 51.
On the growth of nonprofits generally and the failure of our legal system to
fully readjust, see Hansmann, supra note 10.
125. E. LADD & S. LPSET, supra note 119, at 4; Garbarino, supra note 120, at
11. See also J. WEISBERGER, supra note 119, at 2.

1982]

PROFESSIONALS AND UNIONIZATION

though presidents and provosts, themselves distinguished
academicians, traditionally administered colleges and universities, the postwar boom era brought both a new centralization and a new type of professional-the professional
26
administrator.I
From their inception, colleges and universities operated
under a dual authority structure consisting of a bureaucratic
and a professibnal network.127 Ultimate authority over the bureaucratic network vested in the trustees; the professional network included the formal collegial systems of faculty selfgovernment. 128 Although legal power has always remained in
the bureaucratic structure, real power, until very recently, was
in the collegial professional structure. 12 9 There are two primary, related reasons why the professionals wielded the actual
power. First, academics occupied key positions in both structures, and typically engaged in both administrative functions
and teaching.130 Second, because a university's output is education and research, the faculty necessarily made basic decisions concerning the institution's work product. Drawing an
analogy to industrial organizations, one commentator noted
that "[c] ontrol over the 'product' (education) is centered in the
production employees (faculty). The role of the administration
is not to control the final product but rather to serve as a custodian of the material resources necessary to perform the primary educational tasks of the institution."131 The faculty
members typically were involved in establishing standards for
32
admissions, curriculum, hiring, and promotion.1
126.

See note 40 supra and accompanying text.

127. Brown, supra note 123, at 274-76; Kahn, supra note 119, at 73. See
Brousseau, Collective Bargainingand Private University Governments: A Look
from the Law School, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (1977). See also F. KEMERER
& J. BALDRIGE, supra note 119, at 13-19; Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. Tor- L. REV. 608, 615 (1974).
128.

Kahn, supra note 119, at 73. Kahn explains that "the parallelism be-

tween the bureaucratic and the professional authority structures ensures that
professional goals will have strong advocates in the decision-making councils.
Duality of authority and ambiguity of power are the price of ensuring that
faculty expertise will have its say." Id. at 73 (quoting J. BALDRiGE, POWER AND
CoNFLIcT iN THE UNIvERSrrY 114-15 (1971)).
129. See M. Ross, supra note 124, at 179-80.
130. See notes 40 &42 supra and accompanying text; Kahn, supra note 119,
at 68-69.
131. Id. at 67 n.5.
132. Id. at 68. An authority structure almost unique to the university is the
senate. It is a body composed of faculty members elected by their peers within
their departments or schools, administrators appointed by the president, and,

in recent years, students. This collegial body has traditionally had great power
over all aspects of the academic life of the university, from hiring and promo-
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Although the potential for a clash between the two authority structures always existed, as late as 1966 the AAUP, the
American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities still could agree on
a principle of shared authority.133 By the late 1960s and 1970s,
however, professional administrators began to dominate the
new centralized bureaucracy.134 Financial difficulties mandated that universities consider the economic feasibility as well
as the academic value of the programs they offered. The potential clash always existing between the hierarchical, bureaucratic structure and the coarchical, professional structure
became real during the fiscally lean years of the 1960s and
1970s.135

B.

THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

An understanding of America's health care industry must
begin with a discussion of the AMA.136 One article stated:
No other voluntary association commands such power within its area
of interest as does the AMA. It holds a position of authority over the
individual doctor, wields a determining voice in medical education,
tion standards to the opening and closing of entire divisions or schools. See
Brown, supra note 123, at 276-77; Wollett, The Status and Trends of Collective
Negotiationsfor Faculty in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 2, 6-7; cf. F.
KEMERER & J. BALDRIDGE, supra note 119, at 57-60 (power of faculty senate
greater over some areas than others). See generally Kahn, supra note 119, at
69-74; see also Menard, Exploding RepresentationAreas: Colleges and Universi.
ties, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 931, 945-60 (1976).
Although the senate is a body unique to the university setting, other professional employees usually organized coarchically along lines of expertise.
The legality of such organizations under the NLRA is questionable. Cf. Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975) (university senate not a labor organization). But see NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (employee
committee organized by company is labor union under § 2(5) of NLRA). Because the NLRA is based on an adversary model, joint efforts outside of the
traditional union-employer joint committee are suspect. The broad definition of
labor organization in § 2(5) and the prohibition of § 8(a) (2) raise questions
about the legality of either blue-collar "team" efforts or professional coarchical
models. See Feldman & Steinberg, Employee-Management Committees and the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 35 Tu. L REv. 365 (1961); Jackson,
An Alternative to Unionization and the Wholly UnorganizedShop: A Legal Basis for Sanctioning Joint Employer-Employee Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYAcusE L. REV. 809 (1977); Note, Does Employer
Implementationof Employee ProductionsTeams Violate 8(a) (2) of the National
Labor RelationsAct?, 49 IND.LJ.516 (1974).
133. Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 52 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 375 (1966).
134. See notes 40 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
135. M. Ross, supra note 124, at 180-82.
136. For a description of the history, structure, and activities of the AMA,
see Comment, supra note 30.
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controls the conditions of practice, and occupies1 3a7 unique position of
influence in shaping government health policies.

In fact, because the AMA has been so successful in controlling
the practice of medicine in the United States other professional
trade associations used it as a model.138 The AMA controlled
3
medical education and limited entry into the profession,1 9
claiming that only those properly initiated into the profession
were capable of setting standards of education and practice.140
Some of the standards established by the AMA, however, limited entry into the profession in order to screen out those considered undesirable141 and to maintain doctors' status and
incomes.142
Although surgeons and apothecaries formed guilds during
the Renaissance that set standards for entry into and practice
within the profession, 143 doctors until the mid-20th century
practiced medicine individually.144 As late as 1954 the AMA's
"Principles of Medical Ethics"145 were basically "geared to the
typical unit of medical practice in America-the individual
practitioner, remunerated on the basis of a fee for service
rendered."146
Recent developments in the health care industry have derogated the role of the individual practitioner, while promoting
the growth and expansion of hospitals. As health care became
hospital-based, and the number of medical specialties and the
concomitant need for professional training increased, hospitals
changed from small, local, charitable institutions to major industries.147 The role of doctors within hospitals changed correspondingly.148 The modern medical complex now contains a
137. Id. at 1018.
138. Cf. First,Legal Education I, supra note 30, at 353-55 (ABA and AALS
attempted to imitate the AMA by gaining control over standards of legal education and consequently over size of law school classes).
139. See Comment, supra note 30, at 963-76.
140. See notes 31 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
141. The most obvious such exclusion was that of black doctors from state

medical societies, Comment, supra note 30, at 941 & n.22, thus limiting the ability of such doctors to obtain hospital privileges and gain status within the profession. Id. at 939-40. See also note 41 supra.
142. Id. at 965, 969-74.
143. D. GuTHmuE, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 150-51 (1946).
144. See generally V. BULLOUGH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICINE AS A PROFESSION (1966); R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND PUBLIC INTEREST (1971).
145. AMA, GUIDE TO MEDICAL SERVICES 101 (1952).
146. Comment, supra note 30, at 976.
147. See note 14 supra and accompanying text; Comment, The Hospital and
the Staff Physician-AnExpanding Duty of Care, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 249, 25051 (1974).
148. Traditionally an attenuated relationship existed between a private phy-
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large number of interns and residents who are medical school
graduates engaged in advanced medical training through specialty practice.149 These physicians work 100 hours a week,
often in thirty hour shifts, gaining specialized medical training,
sician and the hospital where he practiced. The physician, operating as an independent contractor, merely used the facilities the hospital provided.
Recently, a significant change has occurred in the independent doctor-hospital
relationship. Hospitals are not mere buildings where doctors care for private
patients. Instead, hospitals are now corporate institutions responsible for providing total health care. Craver, The Application of Labor and Antitrust Laws
to Physician Unions: The Need for a Re-Educationof TraditionalConcepts in a
Radically Changing Field, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 55-56 (1975); Southwick, The
Hospital As an Institution-ExpandingResponsibilities Change Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429 (1973); Comment, supra
note 147, at 251.
149. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976), the Board
found, with only Member Fanning dissenting, that "interns, residents, and
clinical fellows, although they possess certain employee characteristics, are primarily students" and excluded them from the coverage of the NLRA. Id. at 251.
It did so despite the fact that, "[aillhousestaff are M.D.'s. All fellows and residents are licensed physicians in every State of the Union." Id. at 255 (Fanning,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). "The housestaff work round-the-clock, 7
days a week, 52 weeks a year," id., and "according to a study initiated by the
Association of American Medical Colleges itself, approximately 80 percent of a
housestaff officer's time is spent 'in direct patient care activities."' Id. at 256
(quoting A. CARRoLL, PROGRAM COST ESTIMATION IN A TEACHING HosPrrA
(1969)). The study further showed that, if housestaff were eliminated, the patient medical care they provided could only be replaced by a "very large staff of
full-time physicians" and would be considerably more expensive. Id. at n.18.
The NLRA contains no specific exclusion of students, and housestaff are
considered employees for other legal purposes. Their stipends, which can exceed $20,000 a year, are considered taxable income under the Internal Revenue
Code, I-.C. § 117; 223 N.L.R.B. at 255 n.17, and, under the tort law theory of respondeat superior, housestaff are considered employees rather than independent contractors for purposes of holding the hospital responsible for their acts.
Id. at 255 n.16. See note 123 supra.
Fanning noted the definition of a professional employee under § 2(12) (b)
and quoted the House conference report language which stated § 2(12) (b) included "legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel together with their
junior professional assistants." 223 N.L.R.B. at 257-58 (quoting H.LR. CONF. REP.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)). Member Fanning further relied on the legislative history of the 1974 amendment to the NLRA which deleted the exclusion of
nonprofit hospitals from the § 2(11) definition of "employer." Fanning highlighted a committee statement, noting "that the Board has carefully avoided applying the definition of a 'supervisor' to a health care professional who gives
direction to other employees, which direction is incidental to the professionals
[sic] treatment of patients and thus is not the exercise of supervisory authority
in the interest of the employer." Id. at 258 (quoting S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1974)) (emphasis added by Fanning).
Since there is normally no direct appeal from a Board decision in a representation case, the Physicians National House Staff Association attempted to
get judicial review of the Board's determination under the extraordinary
method of appeal utilized in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 185 (1945). In Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Murphy, No. 78-1209 (D.C. Cir. April 2, 1979),
Leedom was held to apply and the Circuit Court ruled that the Board had, in
excluding housestaff from the definition of employees, violated "a 'clear and
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treating patients in emergency rooms, in out-patient clinics,
and in the hospital's normal and intensive care units.150

The number of physicians now working in hospitals has
grown in other ways. Hospitals have traditionally operated
with voluntary staffs of attending physicians; only chiefs of
51
service received direct remuneration from the institution.
Today, however, hospitals directly employ paid chiefs of service, paid associate and assistant chiefs, and paid attending physicians, all of whom spend major portions of their work time in
service to the institution. 5 2 Hospitals have also tightened restrictions on the qualifications and activities of voluntary at53
tending physicians.
Furthermore the administrative structure of hospitals has
mandatory' statutory requirement creating rights under the Act." Id., slip op.
at 24.
Upon rehearing en bane, a majority of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, found that
in order to qualify for the Leedom v. Kyne exception a plaintiff must be
able to identify a specific provision of the Act which, although it is
"clear and mandatory" . . . , has nevertheless been violated by the
Board. That the Board may have made an error of fact or law is insufficient; the Board must have acted without statutory authority.
Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). Since the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, this decision thus leaves a very large group of physicians working at hospitals without the protections of the Act. One may ask why the Board
excluded them, despite the similarity of this group to traditional apprentices
who are within the protection of the Act. See, e.g., The Deming Co., 59 N.L.R.B.
526 (1944); E.W. Bliss Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1944); Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Co., 57 N.LR.B. 1053 (1944). An explanation may lie in the unusual bargaining concerns of this group of young physicians.
On March 17, 1975, the Committee of Interns and Residents of New York, a
union representing 3,000 housestaff officers, struck twenty-one private hospitals
in New York City "in the country's first major work stoppage by doctors." N.Y.
Times, March 18, 1975, at 1, col 4. The strike lasted for four days and finally
resulted in a settlement regarding excessive hours which the housestaff
claimed adversely affected not only them but also the quality of care which
their patients were receiving. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1975, at 1, col. 1. It may
have been that the Board, worried about unusual collective bargaining demands that this group would raise once they were certified, chose the easy
course of prohibiting them from organizing under the Act in the first place.
See Malin, Student Employees and Collective Bargaining, 69 Ky. I.J. 1
(1980); Note, Student-Workers or Working Students? A Fatal Questionfor Collective Bargainingof Hospital House Staff, 38 U. Prrr. I. REv. 762 (1977); Note,
Labor Problems of Interns and Residents: The Aftermath of Cedars-Sinai,11
U.S.F. L. REv. 694 (1977).
150. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.I.R.B. 251, 255 (1976) (Fanning,
dissenting).
151. See generally Comment, supra note 147, at 249-50.
152. Id. at 250-51. See Craver, supra note 148, at 65.
153. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 148; Comment, PrivatePhysician Unions:
FederalAntitrust and Labor Law Implications, 20 U.C.LA. I. REV. 983 (1973).
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changed. Like universities, dual systems of authority existed:
54
a professional, collegial model and a bureaucratic model.1
Under the professional model, final control over medical matters rested with the hospital's medical board, usually composed
of the chiefs of service.'-5 Indeed, the AMA required this arrangement. 5 6 Legal control, however, has always vested in a
board of trustees. 5 7 As hospitals have attempted to respond to
the administrative and fiscal concerns accompanying rising
medical costs,' 5 8 a new group of professionals-professional

hospital administrators-has challenged the physicians' historical supremacy.15 9 The health insurance industry and professional standards review organizations are imposing restrictions
on fees and medical treatment.160 An individual physician's
traditional autonomy is also limited by group practices such as
health maintenance organizations.161 Finally, doctors, like
other professionals, are becoming employees of large, bureaucratic organizations 62 or are otherwise limited by the collective
realities of such organizations.
C.

LEGAL LIMrTATIONS ON PROFESSIONAL AsSOCIATONS

As professionals came to be controlled by larger organizations, and as many professionals became employees rather
than individual entrepreneurs, they took collective action to
protect their interests. Traditionally, professionals had successfully used their professional associations to establish mini163
mum standards for compensation and working conditions.
More recently, some recognized the advantages of unionization. 6 4 Court decisions, however, threaten to limit the efficacy
154. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
155. See Craver, supra note 148, at 69.
156. See generally Comment, supra note 30.
157. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
158. See Glantz, A Reply to Professor Craver: Physiciansin Private Practice
Already Have Enough Power, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 315, 325 (1975).
159. See generally VmGrNuA MEDICAL COLLEGE, SCHOOL OF HOsPrrAL ADMINISTRATION, CONTINUING EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, LAW INsTrrUTE ON HosPvnAis
AND MEDICINE (1971).
160. See Craver, supra note 148, at 56-57.
161. Id. at 58.
162. Physicians also believe that they are under attack from other sources.
See Craver, supra note 148, at 56-59. For a response to Professor Craver's generally sympathetic view, see Glantz, supra note 158; Comment, supra note 153.
163. Standards originally focused on the autonomous professional dealing
with individual clients. Recently, as professionals became employees, professional associations have attempted to adapt the standards to professionals employed by large organizations.
164. The AAUP is an example of a professional association whose member-
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of either course of action. The antitrust laws165 and the first
amendment166 may inhibit the activities of professional associations. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,167 the Supreme Court
found that lawyers were not exempt from the limitations of the
antitrust laws simply because their business was a learned profession. 68 Thus, publication by the Virginia State Bar Association of a recommended fee schedule violated the antitrust
laws.169 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council170 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,171
the Court found first and fourteenth amendment172 limitations
on the protective activities of professional associations.173 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy held that commercial speech
was protected by the Constitution, striking down a Virginia
statute allowing the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to discipline a licensed professional pharmacist who truthfully advertised prescription drug prices.74 Bates similarly held that a
rule of the Supreme Court of Arizona prohibiting advertising
by lawyers and providing for disciplinary measures against
those who violated the rule, could not stand under the first
amendment. 7 5 If the antitrust laws 76 and the first amendment
ship overcame its moral qualms about unionization. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. The American Nurses' Association (ANA) is also a
traditional professional association that now engages in collective bargaining.
See French & Robinson, Collective Bargainingby Nurses and Other Professionals: Anomaly or Trend?, 11 LAB. L.J. 903 (1960); Kleingartner, Nurses, Collective
Bargainingand Labor Legislation, 18 LAB. L.J. 236 (1967).
165. See generally Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12
AKRON L. REV. 417 (1979); First, supra note 30; Juris, Collective Bargaining in
Hospitals, Labor Agreements in the Hospital Industry: a Study of Collective
BargainingOutputs, 28 LAB. L.J. 504 (1977); Miller, Becker & Krinsky, Union Effects on Hospital Administration: Preliminary Results From a Three-State
Study, 28 LAB. L.J. 512 (1977); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry: New WarriorsInto an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 446 (1979); Symposium: Market-OrientedApproaches to Achieving Health Policy Goals, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 849 (1981).
For similar problems in a related area, see Roberts & Powers, supra note
118; Comment, Anticompetitive Data Disseminationin the Medical Profession:
The Conflict Between the Sherman Act and the FirstAmendment, 1980 DUKE L.
REv. 1142; Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the
Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE LJ. 576 (1953).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. L
167. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
168. Id. at 787.
169. Id. at 791-92.
170. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
171. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
173. 433 U.S. at 381-82; 425 U.S. at 770.
174. 425 U.S. at 770.
175. 433 U.S. at 381-82.
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prevent professionals from acting collectively in their traditional mode of professional associations, an interpretation that
professionals cannot organize under the NLRA may leave them
without any effective group power.
IV. INTERPRETING THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Congress drafted the NLRA to ameliorate the problems of
rank and file workers employed by hierarchical, bureaucratic
organizations. 7 7 The composition of the work force, however,
has changed significantly in recent years as the number of
white-collar and professional employees has increased.178 Recognizing these changes, the Board in 1970 took jurisdiction over
nonprofit colleges and universities,1 79 and Congress in 1974
passed the Health Care Amendments which eliminated the exclusion of nonprofit private hospitals from the NLRA.180 With
the legal impediments removed, many professionals have attempted to unionize. Their efforts raise basic issues of representation and collective bargaining long thought settled in the
industrial sector. It is not surprising that the Board and the
courts have encountered difficulties in attempting to apply laws
written for traditional, industrial sector workers to this new
and functionally different class of employees. The source of the
difficulties becomes evident with an examination of the statutory framework itself.
1. The Wagner Act
Section 2(3) of the 1935 Wagner Act states that "[t]he term
'employee' shall include any employee,"' 8 ' and only excludes
"any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
176. The dangers resulting from a group of non-employees acting collectively to set wages and prices appear in the cases deciding the antitrust implications of the relationship between newspapers and "newspaper boys." See
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522
F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975); Anaya v. Las Cruces Sun News, 455 F.2d 670 (10th Cir.

1972). See also notes 231-33, 239, 241 infra and accompanying text.
177. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
178. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
179. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334 (1970), overruling Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424,427 (1951). See notes 286-89 infra and accompanying text.

180. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 169 (1976).
181. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L, No. 74-198, § 2(3), 49 Stat.
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domestic service of any family or person at his home."18 2 Although violating the most basic rule of statutory drafting by defining a term, employee, with the same term, it is clear that
Congress meant to interpret the term broadly in light of the
Act's purpose. The purpose of the Act was to redress the "inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized in the corporate or other
forms of ownership associations"' 8 3 by allowing workers to organize and collectively bargaining for "the friendly adjustment
of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
84
hours, or other working conditions.'
Section 2(3) of the Wagner Act expansively defines an em85
ployer as "any person acting in the interest of an employer."'
Both the theoretical antagonism between rank and file workers
and management, 86 and Congress's distrust of company-dominated unions, 87 underlay this broad definition. During the
First World War, labor-management committees were formed
to achieve the cooperation and increased production required
by the war effort.188 After the war, many of these committees
continued as company-dominated unions, growing in number
and strength under the auspices of the National Industrial Recovery Administration.18 9 Such company-dominated unions
were anathema to organized labor, and the Wagner Act there182. Id.
183.

United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 545

(1939).
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. See Note, New Standardsfor Domination and Support Under Section
8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510, 515 (1973); notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
187. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1935). See notes 112-13
supra and accompanying text.

188. These committees were organized under the auspices of the War Production Board. See 4 S. PERLMAN & P. TArT, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNrrED

STATES, 1896-1932, at 409 (1936). Other national emergencies generated a similar response. During the Great Depression, Congress enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), at the request of the
Roosevelt administration. The National War Labor Board was founded during
World War IM See Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942). These three
developments represented pragmatic responses to the need for a coordinated
and intensive response to national emergencies. During each of these periods,
cooperation to achieve increased production was essential.
189. For early articles discussing company unions, see Crager, Company
Unions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 40 MIc. L. REv. 831 (1942);
Note, Employer-Dominated Unions--Illusory Self-Organization, 40 COLUM. L.

REV. 278 (1940). For articles discussing more recent developments, see Jackson, supra note 132; Miller, ProfessionalAssociations and Supervisor Members:
When Does an Employer Dominate and Interfere? 30 LAB. L.J. 31 (1979);
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fore barred them. 190 Since employers had used supervisors to
organize and control company unions, the Wagner Act defined
employer broadly to preclude this practice. Consistent with
this definition, early cases found unfair labor practices'91 if supervisory personnel were involved in the organization or forma2
tion of a union.19
During the period between the Wagner Act and the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments, the Board interpreted sections 2(2)
and 2(3) to determine whether specific classes of workers were
covered by the NLRA. Largely in the context of representation
cases, the Board gradually developed definitions and rules regarding confidential, supervisory, and managerial employees.
Exercising its discretion to determine appropriate bargaining
units,193 the Board adopted a policy excluding confidential, supervisory, and managerial employees from rank and file
94
units.
From its earliest cases, the Board defined confidential employees as those employees whose work is connected with the
employer's labor relations activities.195 The Board excluded
confidential employees not only from rank and file units but
also totally excluded them from the coverage of the NLRA.196
This exclusion, however, did not extend to employees with acSangerman, Employee Committees: Can They Survive Under the Taft-Hartley
Act? 24 LAB. L.J. 684 (1973).
190. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 8(2), 49 Stat.
449, 452.
191. Id. § 8, 49 Stat. at 452.
192. See Crager, supra note 189, at 840-42, and cases cited therein; Note,
supra note 189, at 283-90, and cases cited therein.
193. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 9(b), 49
Stat. 449, 453. See generally R. GoRmAN, BASic TEXT ON LABOR LAw: UmomATION AND CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 66-68 (1976).
194. See notes 195-230 infra and accompanying text.
195. We take notice of the fact that in negotiating and in other dealings
concerning grievances, the interests of a union and the management
are ordinarily adverse. The nature of a personal secretary's work is
such that much of the confidential material pertaining to the management passes through his or her hands. We believe that the management should not be required to handle such material through
employees in the unit represented by the union with which it is
dealing.
Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. 974, 986 (1939) (secretaries to the managing
editor and editor excluded as confidential employees); accord, In re The Hoover Co., 55 N.L.B. 1321, 1323 (1944) (stenographers and clerical workers who
had access to confidential information regarding grievances and other labor relations matters excluded as confidential employees); Creamery Package Mfg.
Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108, 110 (1941) (stenographer excluded from unit of office employees as a confidential employee).
196. Electric Boat Co., 57 NJ.R.B. 1348, 1349 (1944).
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cess to other kinds of confidential information.197 In 1946, in In
re Ford Motor Co.,198 the NLRB further "limit[ed] the term
'confidential' to embrace only those employees who assist and
act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations."' 99 The NLRB has
200
continued to apply this definition of confidential employees.
In Ford, the Board also attempted to precisely define man.agerial employees as "executive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies." 2o' Although the Board considered the status of managerial employees prior to the Ford case, its position was not
well developed. 2 02 These early cases involved only the exclusion of specific employees from rank and file units. They did
not consider whether managerial employees were entitled to
203
organize their own bargaining units.
The status of supervisors under the Wagner Act was more
problematic. The Board initially recognized that the Act protected supervisory employees 20 4 against unfair labor prac197. See, e.g., NLRB v. Armour Co., 154 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 1946), aff'g 49
N.L.R.B. 688 (1943) (included clerks had access to knowledge which might injure their employer if disclosed to competitors); Micamold Radio Corp., 58
N.L.R.B. 880, 891 (1944) (payroll clerks with access to confidential information
regarding rates of pay and wages included); In re Chrysler Corp., 58 N.L.R.B.
239, 243-44 (1944) (cost clerks having access to confidential business records included); In re Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 54 N.LRB. 103, 113 (1943)
(clerks who handled confidential information such as production schedules and
employment and personal records included).
198. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
199. Id. at 1322.
200. See notes 247-50, 333-34 infra and accompanying text.
201. 66 N.L.R.B. at 1322.
202. See, e.g., In re The Elec. Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1246
(1946) (buyer excluded from unit of clerical employees as "managerial employee"); Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) (Board "customarily excluded from bargaining units of rank and file workers executive employees who
are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies"); In re Barrett Div., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1946) (assistants to buyer excluded from unit of office clerical employees as "exercis[ing] a function closely
allied to management"); Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944) (expeditors excluded from unit because "authority... to exercise their discretion
in making commitments on behalf of the Company stamps them as managerial"); In re Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944) (buyers excluded
from clerical unit as "their duties are closely allied to management, differing
materially from those of the other clerical employees"); In re Julien P. Friez &
Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943) (expediters excluded from a unit as "closely related to the management").
203. In In re Dravo Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 1174, 1177 (1944), the Board excluded
buyers and expeditors from an office and clerical unit, but disclaimed any opinion regarding the right of these employees to self-organization under the Act.
204. See, e.g., Warfield Co., 6 N.LR.B. 58 (1938) (employer unfair labor practices against the chief engineer, id. at 61-64; creation of a separate bargaining
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and the courts of appeals enforced these orders.20 In
1942, in Union Collieries Coal Co.,207 the NLRB considered for
the first time in a representation case whether supervisors
were entitled to their own bargaining unit as covered employees. The NLRB, noting both Congress's intent regarding the
definition of covered employees 208 and the Supreme Court's
broad treatment of the term,2 09 held that the supervisors at issue, assistant mine foremen and fire bosses, were entitled to
their own bargaining unit.210 The NLRB did not find it inconsistent to consider the supervisors representatives of the employer relative to lower level employees under the section 2(2)
definition of employer and yet covered employees in their own
right under section 2(3).211 In 1943, a divided Board in Maryland Drydock Co.212 reversed Union Collieries, but within two
Motor
years MarylandDrydock was itself reversed by Packard
214
Car Co.,213 a case the Supreme Court later affirmed.
tices, 205

unit of engineers, id. at 69); Star Publishing Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 498 (1937) (employer unfair labor practices against district and branch managers who were
supervisors, id. at 501-05).
205. The unfair labor practice cases, see note 204 supra, involved violations
of sections 7, 8(1), and 8(3). Section 7 provided: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection." National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 7, 49
Stat. 449, 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)). Under section 8: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; ... (3) By
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ... ." Id. at § 8, 49 Stat. at 452 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(1976)).
206. See Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 738 n.3 (1943); Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 965 n.2 (1942) and cases cited therein.
207. 44 N.LR.B. 165 (1942), enforcing Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B.
961 (1942).
208. 44 N.L.R.B. at 167-68.
209. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182, 191-93 (1941), cited in 44
N.L.R.B. at 167-68.
210. 44 N.L.R.B. at 169.
211. Id. at 167-68.
A foreman, in his relation to his employer, is an employee, while in
his relation to the laborers under him he is the representative of the
employer and within the definition of section 2(2) of the Act. Nothing
in the Act excepts foremen from its benefits nor from protection
against discrimination nor unfair labor practices of the master.
NILRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F.2d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1940),
cited in 44 N.L.R.B. at 167 n.3.
212. 49 N.LR.B. 733 (1943).
213. 61 N.L.RIB. 4 (1945), enforced, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946).
214. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
The Packard case must be understood in light of the significant problems
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The NLRB distinguished Packardfrom Maryland Drydock
on the ground that the petitioning foremen's organization in
Maryland Drydock had also been the representative of the
company's rank and file workers.2 15 The Board in Packard
found that no dangers, such as illegal domination or support of
a rank and file union, could exist when the foremen were repre2 16
sented by an independent and unaffiliated foremen's union.
Furthermore, it found that it could adequately police the certification to guard against future affiliation.217 The Board dismissed the employer's contention that unionization of foremen
would be incompatible with their duties, observing that,
"[s] uch an assumption is not only repugnant to the basic democratic philosophy upon which this Act is founded, but it has
2
never proved valid in our experience under the Act." 18
The Supreme Court decided Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB219 on a five to four vote,220 sustaining the Board's finding
supervisors faced during and after World War IL Legislation applicable during
the Second World War discouraged economic struggles between management
and labor. See Levinson, Foremen's Unions and the Law, 1950 Wis. L.REv.79,
79-82 (1950); Updegraff, War-Time Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 29 IowA L.
REv. 328, 335 (1944). In addition, to promote a high level of wartime production,
the salaries and hours of rank and file workers were increased. Packard Motor
Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. at 12-13. Although foremen assumed they were aligned
with management and not with rank and fie employees, the combination of the
rise of "scientific management," see Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.LR.B. at 9-10;
note 23 supra and accompanying text, and "the presence of strong unions of
rank and fie," id., affected their status. In addition, the failure of their wages
and hours to keep pace with those of rank and file employees caused them to
recognize that lack of collective action had put them in a disadvantageous position. See Comment, Rights of Supervisory Employees to Collective Bargaining
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 55 YALE LJ.754, 754-56 (1946). Today's white collar and professional employees have problems similar to those
of foremen during the 1940s. See note 41 supra; notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
For early articles discussing supervisors, see Cooper, The Status of Foremen as "Employees" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 15 FoRDAai L.
REV. 191 (1946); Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 IowA L. REv. 297 (1944); Petro, True Supervisory
Status, 1 LAB. L.J. 754 (1950); Comment, supra.
215. Although the Board in Packard admitted that it had dismissed the petitions of independent and unaffiliated supervisory unions on the authority of
MarylandDrydock, it stated in Packard that it had done so on the basis of potential, not actual dangers. 61 N.LR.B. at 17.
216. Id. at 16.
217. Id. at 17.
218. Id. at 19.
219. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
220. Id. at 493, 501. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion. Justice
Douglas's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton. Justice Frankfurter joined in Justice Douglas's dissent except for the first section,
the section later cited by Justice Powell in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 278 (1974). See note 329 infra and accompanying text.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:383

that the supervisors at issue in Packardwere employees within
the meaning of section 2(3) and therefore entitled to the protections of the Act. They rejected the employer's argument
that the supervisors came within the section 2(2) definition of
employer on the ground that "[elvery employee, from the very
fact of employment in the master's business, is required to act
in his interest."22 1 The majority recognized that although the
foremen acted on behalf of the employer, their interests were
adverse "when it comes to fixing [their] own wages, hours, seniority rights or working conditions." 222 Thus, the foremen's
need for collective action in their own interests was consistent
with, and sanctioned by, the Act. Deferring to the expertise of
the Board,223 the majority also emphasized the large number of
employees involved, distinguishing this large group of low224
ranking supervisors from high-ranking corporate officials.
Justice Douglas's dissent foreshadowed Congress's specific
exclusion of supervisors in the Taft-Hartley Amendments enacted later that year. 2 2 5 Justice Douglas refused to draw a distinction between corporate officials and lower level supervisors,
arguing that foremen, as well as vice presidents, played a supervisory role within the enterprise. 22 6 Thus, he speculated
that if foremen were allowed to unionize, all supervisory personnel would have the same right.227 Justice Douglas took a
strong ideological position regarding the proper organization of
business entities and the relationships between its owners,
managers, and workers. Once unionized, he observed, "management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx than
separate factions in warring camps."228 Such an arrangement
would be contrary to the adversarial relationship between
workers and supervisors that Justice Douglas regarded as the
proper organization of a business entity.229 If Congress had
221. 330 U.S. at 488-89.
222. Id. at 489.
223. Id. at 491-93.
224. If a union of vice-presidents, presidents or others of like relationship to a corporation comes here claiming rights under this Act, it will
be time enough then to point out the obvious and relevant differences
between the 1,100 foremen of this company and corporate officers
elected by the board of directors.
Id. at 490 n.2.
225. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 2(3), 2(11), 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (11) (1976).
226. 330 U.S. at 494-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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meant to include all supervisory personnel within the definition
of employees protected under the NLRA and to thereby bring
about a major change in the operation of our business entities,
Justice Douglas believed Congress would have made its intent
clear.2 30
The Supreme Court previously held that independent contractors were included within the Act's definition of employees.
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications,23 1 the Court deferred to the
Board's broad reading of the statutory term "employee" in finding that newspaper boys who sold newspapers at fixed spots
were employees of the Hearst Publishing Company.23 2 In
Hearst, as in Packard,both the Board and the Court looked to
economic realities to determine if the individuals at issue were
subject to the kind of "inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract, and employers" 233 that Congress
sought to redress with its passage of the Wagner Act.
2.

The Taft-Hartley Amendments

Although the Congress that passed the Taft-Hartley
Amendments in 1947 has been widely recognized as conservative and promanagement,2 34 the legislative process necessitates
compromise. A comparison of the House 23 5 and Senate2 36 bills
as reported with the House 237 and Senate238 bills as passed,
reveals that the House was considerably more promanagement
than the Senate. In the representation area, Congress was
most concerned with legislatively overruling Hearst239 and
Packard.240 The House bill excluded independent contrac230. Id. at 495, 498.
231. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
232. Id. at 130.
233. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 126.
234. See Cox, supra note 107, at 44-49 (pt.1), 314-15 (pt.2).
235. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in SUBCoMM. ON LABOR, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93d CONG., 2d SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ].
236. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 235, at 99.
237. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 235, at 158.
238. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 235, at 226.
239. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 235, at 292, 309.
240. Id. at 13, reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 304; S. REP. No. 105, 80th
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tors,24 1 and both the House242 and Senate243 bills excluded su-

pervisors from the definition of employee. However, the two
bills differed drastically in their definitions of excluded supervisors. The Senate bill contained the definition of supervisor 244
that was finally enacted and remains the law today. In the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments the supervisor excluded from the
definition of covered employees in section 2(3) is defined in
section 2(11) as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or245clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.

The House bill contained similar language 24 6 but included two
additional sections, 247 which excluded from the coverage of the
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprinted in LEGIsLATIrvE HISTORY, supra note 235, at

410.
241. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 235, at 161-62.
242. Id., reprintedin LEGISLATmE HISTORY, supra note 235, at 161-62.
243. Id., reprintedin LEGISLATIV HISTORY, supra note 235, at 230.
244. Id. § 2(11), reprinted in L!GISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 235, at 232.

245. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11) (1976).
246. The term "supervisor" means any individual(A) who has authority, in the interest of the employer(i) to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, demote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline any individuals employed by the
employer, or to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend
any such action; or
(ii) to determine, or make effective recommendations with respect to, the amount of wages earned by any individuals employed by
the employer, or to apply, or to make effective recommendations with
respect to the application of, the factors upon the basis of which the
wages of any individuals employed by the employer are determined, if
in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of
a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the exercise of independent judgment.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIV HISTORY, supra note 235, at 167.
247. The House bill also defined a supervisor as any individual
(B) who is employed in labor relations, personnel, employment police, or time-study matters or in connection with claims matters of employees against employers, or who is employed to act in other respects
for the employer in dealing with other individuals employed by the employer, or who is employed to secure and furnish to the employer informaton to be used by the employer in connection with any of the
foregoing; or
(C) who by the nature of his duties is given by the employer information that is of a confidential nature, and that is not available to the public, to competitors, or to employees generally, for use in the interest of
the employer.

1982]

PROFESSIONALS AND UNIONIZATION

Act broad categories of employees, such as guards, time-study
persons, personnel employees, and persons other than those
engaged in labor relations who possessed confidential information. 248 The House report explained the exclusion of foremen
and discussed the extensive exclusions of other employees in
the House

bill.249

The Conference Committee rejected the House bill's expansive definition of excluded supervisors in favor of the Senate bill's more limited definition. To understand the degree of
rejection the House proposals met it is important to note the
section of the Conference Report discussing supervisors.
[BIoth the House bill and the Senate amendment excluded supervisors from the individuals who are to be considered employees for the
purposes of the act. The House bill defined as "supervisors", however,
certain categories of employees who were not treated as supervisors
Id. § 2(12), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 235, at 168. See also
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1947) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 235, at 307-08, 314 (discussion of excluded employees).
248. The Board previously found that the Act covered each of these classes
of employees. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.RB. 1317, 1322-23 (1946) (timestudy persons); American Steel &Wire Co., 58 N.LR.B. 253, 255 (1944) (employees with access to personnel records); Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 41
N.L.R B. 973 (1942) (guards); Bendix Prod. Corp., 3 N.LR.B. 682, 688 (1937)
(guards).
For cases regarding confidential employees, see note 197 supra.
249. The House Report stated,
Other employees handle intimate details of the business that frequently are highly confidential. Some affect the employer's relations
with labor. Others affect its relations with its competitors. In neither
case should the employee's loyalty be divided. That which affects the
company's relations with its competitors certainly ought not to be open
to members of a union that deals also with the firm's competitors.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HIsTORY, supra note 235, at 307-08.

The House Report also explained the bill's broad definition of excluded
confidential employees:
The ... important change concerns confidential employees. These are
people who receive from their employers information that not only is
confidential but also that is not available to the public, or to competitors, or to employees generally. Most of the people who would quality
as "confidential" employees are executives and are excluded from the
act in any event.
The Board, itself, normally excludes from bargaining units confidential clerks and secretaries to such people as these. But protecting
confidential financial information from competitors and speculators,
protecting secret processes and experiments from competitors, and
protecting other vital secrets ought not to rest in the administrative
discretion of the Board or on the responsibility of whatever union happens to represent the employees. The bill therefore excludes from the
definition of employees persons holding positions of trust and confidence whose duties give them secret information. The bill does not forbid these people to organize. It merely leaves their organizing and
bargaining activities outside the provisions of the act.
Id. at 23, reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra'note235, at 314.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:383

under the Senate amendment. These were generally (A) certain personnel who fix the amount of wages earned by other employees....
(B) labor relations personnel, police, and claims personnel, and
(C) confidential employees. The Senate amendment confined the definition of "supervisor" to individuals generally regarded as foremen and
persons of like or higher rank.
The conference agreement, in the definition of "supervisor," limits
such term to those individuals treated as supervisors under the Senate
amendment. In the case of persons working in the labor relations, personnel and employment departments, it was not thought necessary to
make specific provision, as was done in the House bill, since the Board
has treated, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons as
outside the scope of the act. This is the prevailing Board practice with
respect to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was
of the conferees to alter this practice in any
not the2 5intention
0
respect.

The Report notes, however, that some employees might qualify
for inclusion in separate bargaining units under the provisions
251
of the Senate bill dealing with professional employees.
Thus, the 1947 Congress, by specifically excluding independent contractors from the section 2(3) definition of employee, legislatively overruled Hearst. By specifically excluding
supervisors from the section 2(3) definition, Congress overruled Packard. The NLRB had been responsive in these decisions to the economic realities of employees. Congress,
however, reinforced the traditional hierarchical, pyramidal
structure of economic entities by excluding supervisors, and
further limited access to collective action by excluding independent contractors.2 52 Congress chose to affirm as to these
two groups of workers a view of the economy that was less
valid in 1947 than in 1935, and which is invalid today. Significantly, however, the legislative history never mentions managerial employees and contains only five references to confidential
253
employees.
The same 1947 Congress that specifically excluded supervisors specifically included professional employees. In adopting
250.

H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 570, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1947), reprinted in

LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY,

.spra note 235, at 539-40.

251. Id.
252. Archibald Cox called the exclusion of foreman and other supervisors in
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments "[tihe [Act's] most important limitation."
Cox, supra note 107, at 4. He stated.
If top management has learned from its recent experience that the
foremen's problems are its own, and accords foremen a status and
measure of individual dignity commensurate with the functions that it
theoretically assigns them, there should be little occasion to seek recognition and bargaining rights by economic strength.
Id. at 5.
253. See notes 337-40 infra and accompanying text.
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the Senate's definition of a "professional employee,"25 4 Congress legitimized under the Act their coarchical, collegial mode
of operation. Section 2(12)255 defines a "professional employee" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical,
or physical work, (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion
and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in re-

lation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by
a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in
an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a
general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training
in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph
(a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee
as defined in paragraph (a). 256

Furthermore, recognizing the professional employees' unique
community of interest, Congress in section 9(b)(1)257 gave

them the right to a separate bargaining unit. Thus, the generally conservative 1947 Congress not only allowed professionals
to organize, but also recognized that they "excercise [d] discretion and judgment"258 in their work and supervised others in
259
their professional capacity.

The similar definitions of excluded supervisors and included professionals has created the inevitable tension of ap254. S. 1126, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATrVE HISTORY,
supra note 235, at 104-05.
255. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(12), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(12) (1976).
256. Id.
The House bill did not contain any definition of the term "professional employee," but section 9(f) (2) thereof gave professional personnel and other distinguishable groups of employees an opportunity to
exclude themselves from larger bargaining units in which it was proposed that they be included. The Senate amendment accorded a similar treatment to professional employees and defined the term. This
definition in general covers such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel together with their junior professional assistants. The conference agreement contains the same definition of
"professional employee" as that contained in the Senate amendment,
and accords to this category the same treatment which was provided
for them in section 9(f) (3) of the House bill.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 570, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947), reprinted in LEGIsLATIvE HIsToRY, supra note 235, at 540.
257. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9(b) (1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b) (1)(1976).
258. Id. § 2(12) (a) (ii), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (a) (ii) (1976).
259. Id. § 2(12)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(b)(1976).
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parent inconsistency in the scope of the Act's coverage. 60
Excluded supervisors, by definition, are those who have authority "not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requir[ing]
the use of independent judgment" to "responsibly ... direct"
other employees. 2 61 Included professionals, by definition, "en-*
gag[e] in work... intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine[, ... involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment."2 62 Under section 2(12)(b), professionals "superv[ise]" those "performing related work ... to
qualify... to become a professional." 263 The major representational issue involving professional employees is whether they
are included professionals or excluded by either the specific
statutory exclusion of supervisors or the nonstatutory exclusion of managers.
Congress apparently gave little thought to the Act's conflicting definitions as they apply to professional employees. Although Congress specifically included professional employees
within the coverage of the Act and granted them their own bargaining units2 64 in recognition of their unique common interests, 265 the NLRA itself is based on a hierarchical, bureaucratic
model of traditional industrial organizations. The collegial,
communal method of operation used by professional employees, however, presents problems when the Board and the
courts attempt to apply the Act to professional employees' representation efforts. Similar problems emerge in cases involving
professional employees' attempts at collective bargaining.
The major problems in the collective bargaining area involve the definition of mandatory subjects of bargaining.2 66 Although Congress granted professionals the right to a separate
bargaining unit, when boards and courts have examined subjects of bargaining, they have declared that many professional
issues are nonmandatory. 67 Under an industrial model, professionals' traditional concerns fall under the heading of management prerogatives.
260. See note 347 infra.
261. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C.

§ 152(11) (1976).
262. Id. § 2(12)(a), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) (1976).
263. Id. § 2(12) (b), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (b)(1976).
264. Id. §§ 2(12), 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(12), 159(b)(1) (1976).
265. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947); 93 CONG. REc. 3741
(1947) (remarks by Rep. Jackson); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
266. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976).
267. See note 272 infra and accompanying text.
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429

Under the NLRA an employer must bargain about "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."268 The
Act has been interpreted to impose no duty to bargain about
nonmandatory subjects-subjects not directly related to wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment. 269 The closing
of one factory in a multi-factory operation normally would not
be a mandatory subject of bargaining,2 70 although it is difficult
to see how the complete elimination of jobs would not be directly related to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Questions of direct or indirect relationship may,
however, merely camouflage the actual issue: preservation of
the traditional model of the enterprise. Under the traditional
model, whether an enterprise will exist at all, the form in which
it will exist, and what it will manufacture are the sole prerogatives of the stockholders through their representatives on the
board of directors and management, not the concern of the employees. 27 l Given the primary interests of professional employees, they would seek to expand the definition of mandatory
subjects of bargaining beyond that developed in the traditional
industrial context. 27 2 Because these bargaining concepts are
novel, however, there is a reluctance to allow even the possibility of such bargaining. The easiest way to avoid problems involving subjects of bargaining is to prevent groups interested in
268. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976). See, e.g., Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargainingby
the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REV. 389 (1950); Rabin,
Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work,- The Search For
StandardsIn Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L REV. 803
(1971).
269. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952); NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958).
270. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263,
273-74 (1965). See also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573,
2585 (1981).
271. An uneasy compromise has been reached regarding the notion of "impact bargaining." Although employees may not have the right to bargain about
a basic decision itself, they do have the right to bargain about the impact of
such a decision on their wages, hours, and terms and condition of employment.
In reality, impact bargaining may be expanded to include the basic decision itself.
In European countries, labor has an important voice in such issues. This is
accomplished through a system of "company laws" providing for employee representation on supervisory boards dealing with basic issues involving the economic entity. See notes 90-94 supra and accompanying text. The latest
American management techniques advocate involving rank and file workers,
not merely professionals, in this type of basic decision. See notes 66-86 supra
and accompanying text.
272. See Note, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee, 69
CoLuM. L. REv. 277 (1969).
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such expansive issues from coming within the scope of the labor laws at the representation stage.

B.

THE ROLES OF THE NLRB AND THE COURTS

The NLRA provides the standard for judicial review of
NLRB determinations. The Act states that "the findings of the
Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be...
conclusive." 2 73 The Supreme Court interpreted this standard to
require a very high degree of deference to NLRB findings of
fact,2 74 but the Act sets no specific standard for reviewing questions of law. Although it is hard to envision pure questions of
fact as opposed to pure questions of law, the courts exhibit
greater deference to Board decisions characterized as factual,
as opposed to legal. 275 Regarding legal issues, 276 the Supreme
Court has stated that NLRB rules may be judicially reviewed
only "for consistency with the Act, and for rationality." 277 Such
a standard is sensible when courts are reviewing a Board interpretion of the NLRA. Since the Board is the specialized agency
charged with the administration of the Act, it constantly deals
with the interpretation of that statute in the context of the realities of the American workplace. As the Court noted, "[i]t is
the Board on which Congress conferred the authority to de273. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1976).

274. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
275. Frequently, courts determine that a statement is factual or legal as a
justification for the greater or lesser vigor they use to review Board decisions.
R. GOBMAN, supra note 193, at 13.
276. Some authoritites have stated.
One may question how much actually turns on formal distinctions
between questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law
and fact ....

The degree of deference accorded by the courts has not

seemed to turn necessarily on any formal definition regarding the nature of the question involved. Instead, though it is difficult to generalize on the question, courts have tended to assume greater
responsibility in passing upon issues of law where (1) they require a
weighing of other statutes or policies not confided to the special jurisdiction of the Board; (2) they involve common-law or constitutional
considerations rather than "technical" matters requiring administrative
expertise; (3) they involve controversial questions which demand the
prestige of judicial resolution; or (4) they require the interpretation of
statutory language in the light of legislative history rather than specialized judgments of a kind which the agency is peculiarly qualified to
make.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 111 (A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman eds.)
(9th ed. 1981).
277. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978). See also NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
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velop and apply fundamental national labor

policy."

278

In addition, the organization of the NLRA clearly indicates
that limited review of Board decisions regarding representation
issues, such as the status of a particular type of employee, is
required. No direct review of a Board decision exists in such
27 9
cases since the Board's determination is not a "final order."
An employer may contest a representation decision in court
only by refusing to bargain, thereby creating an unfair labor
practice. 280 Because the statute specifically provides for very
limited review of representation issues, the standard of judicial
review in an unfair labor case based on a representation issue
should be even narrower than the limited review normally
28
allowed. 1
In formulating labor policy, the Board can proceed by either case-by-case adjudication or by administrative rulemaking.282 The Board's decision to proceed by adjudication in the
university cases may be due to Congress's failure to consider
the status of university professors under the NLRA. Neither
the 1935 nor the 1947 Congress was concerned about the application of the NLRA to university professors, 283 because of the
widely held belief that nonprofit institutions, such as hospitals
and colleges and universities, were small, local charitable institutions that would rarely come within the reach of the Commerce Clause. The 1947 House bill would have excluded all
284
such nonprofit organizations from the definition of employer,
but on this issue also the more conservative House lost. The
Conference Committee agreed to exclude only nonprofit
285
hospitals.
278. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500 (1978).
279. Under subsections 10(e) and (f) only "final orders" may be appealed.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 10(e) & (f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
& (f) (1976). In Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), the Supreme Court did
allow limited district court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976), in cases where
the Board's decision was ultra vires.
280. Unless a union comes within the very limited Leedom v. Kyne exception, there is no way for it to appeal an adverse decision in a representation
case. See note 149 supra.
281. See NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). See also R. GoRMAN, supra note
193, at 67.
282. See R. GoRmNi,
supra note 193, at 15-18.
283. See Greng, The Implications of NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 9 J.L, &
ED. 479, 483 n.17 (1980).
284. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 235, at 160-61.
285. H.R. CoNrF. REP. No. 570, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1947), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 235, at 535-36.
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When the Board was first faced with a representation petition from nonprofit professional employees in Trustees of Columbia University2 86 in 1951, it refused to exercise its
jurisdiciton. The legislators and courts, however, could not continue to ignore education's growth as a major industry. In 1966,
Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to bring nonprofit private universities within its coverage. 2 87 In 1968 the
Supreme Court recognized in Maryland v. Wirtz288 that schools
affect commerce. Finally, in 1970, the Board in Cornell University overruled Columbia and asserted jurisdiction over private
colleges and universities. 289 Later that same year, the Board
outlined by rulemaking the minimal characteristics that would
cause it to take jurisdiction over an individual school.290 The
next year, in C.W. Post Center of Long Island University,29 ' the
Board, for the first time, established a unit of college professors
which included all full-time and part-time faculty but excluded
292
deans and department chairs.
Notwithstanding the deferential standard of review, the
courts have resisted the Board's holding that college and university professors are covered employees. Yeshiva is the latest
example of a pattern of criticism by the courts 293 and the commentators 294 regarding the Board's use of an ad hoc adjudicative approach and its failure to rationalize its decisions.
In defense of the Board, the Supreme Court has recognized
that "[t] he responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns
286. 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951). The Board in Columbia University never ruled
that it lacked jurisdiction, but merely refused to exercise its discretion. NLRB
v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 555 (1st Cir. 1975).
287. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b),
80 Stat. 830.
288. 392 U.S. 183, 194 (1968), overruled on other grounds, National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
289. 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334 (1970).
290. 35 Fed. Reg. 18,370 (1970), 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1980).
291. 189 N.LR.B. 904 (1971).
292. Id. at 908.
293. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). Although Justice
Fortas's four member plurality opinion upheld the Board's determination, it
was critical of the Board's use of adjudication rather than rulemaking. Justice
Douglas's stinging dissent, id. at 775, catalogued the reasons why an administrative agency should proceed by rulemaking rather than adjudication. Adding
the dissents of Douglas and Harlan, id. at 780, to the four member plurality
opinion, it is clear that six justices were extremely critical of the Board's proceeding by adjudication rather than rulemaking.
294. Kahn, supra note 119.
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of industrial life is entrusted to the Board."295 Because of the
novelty of faculty unionization and the unusual nature of the
professional employees involved, it made sense for the Board
to proceed on a case-by-case basis, developing parameters as it
came to understand the nature of the employees and their employment relationship. For these reasons, one commentator
has recently suggested that it is preferable for the Board to
proceed through adjudication rather than rulemaking. 9 6 If it
proceeds by adjudication, however, the Board should, as it
learns more about a new field, carefully explain the rationale
for its decisions. Although the Board developed through case
adjudication a consistent and rationally explained position in
professional unionization cases, 29 7 it did not spell out that posi-

tion in any one university case. For this, the Board can be
faulted.
Nevertheless, the Board's decisions reveal a preference for
including employees within the coverage and protections of the
Act. Although the courts and Congress have not always agreed,
the Board has found newspaper boys,2 98 lower level supervisors, 299 buyers,3 00 and university professors3 01 within the defini-

tion of covered employees. In Hendricks County Rural Electric
Membership Corp. v. NLRB,302 the Board reaffirmed its limitation of the definition of confidential employees to those who
"assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formu295. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). See also American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).

In upholding the Board's decisions on a faculty unit in NLRB v. Wentworth
Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 555 (lst Cir. 1975) (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975)), the First Circuit stateck
'The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is
particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier decisions froze the
development of this important aspect of national labor law [right to
have union representative present at employer investigative interview]
would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking. "'Cumulative experience" begets understanding and insight by which judgments ...

are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant

process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything
else the adninistrative from the judicial process.' NLRB v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349, 73 S. Ct. 287, 290, 97 L. Ed. 377 (1953)."
296. See Note, NLRB Rulemaking: PoliticalReality Versus ProceduralFairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982, 983-84 (1980).
297. See notes 347-87 infra and accompanying text.
298. Hearst Publications, Inc., 39 N.LR.B. 1245, 1250 (1942).
299. Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.RB. 4, 19 (1945).
300. Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.LIRB. 431, 432 (1971).
301. Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.LR.B. 1053, 1056 (1975).
302. 236 NJ.R3B. 1616 (1978), rev'd, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S.
Ct. 216 (1981); see notes 344-46 infra and accompanying text.
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late, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field
of labor relations." 303 In each of these cases, the Board extended the Act's coverage to redress the workplace disabilities
which the NLRA sought to remedy.
V. THE PROFESSIONAL CASES
A. NLRB v.

BELL AEROSPACE CO.-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES

NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 304 laid the foundation for the
Supreme Court's Yeshiva3O5 opinion. Justice Powell authored
both majority opinions and both cases were decided by five-tofour votes. Justice Powell's opinions in both cases reveal a
strong, traditional view of the proper organization of an economic entity and the appropriate relationship between labor
and management. In Bell Aerospace, the Court held that all
managerial employees were excluded from the coverage of the
NLRA.306 The opinion is noteworthy because it contains the
seeds for the exclusion of virtually all professional and whitecollar employees through expansive definitions and applications of the managerial and confidential employees exceptions.
A careful examination of Bell Aerospace is therefore essential
to the understanding of Yeshiva.
Because neither the Act nor its legislative history refers to
managerial employees, 3 07 Justice Powell based his decision on
three other factors: longstanding agency interpretations of the
statute, congressional reenactment of the Act without pertinent
change, and subsequent legislation declaring the congressional
intent.308 Justice Powell's analysis omitted, however, the cardi303. 236 N.L.R.B. at 1619 (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724
(1956)).
304. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justice
White's opinion, dissenting in part, was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart,
and Marshall.
305. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Rehnquist. Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
306. 416 U.S. at 289-90.
307. See note 253 supra and accompanying text.
308. 416 U.S. at 274-75. Justice Powell's analysis is undermined by his failure to distinguish between holding and dictum in the cases he cites in support
of his arguments. Justice Powell cites the Board's holdings that managers do
not belong in, and are therefore excluded from, rank and file units in support of
his assertion that managers cannot unionize because they are excluded from
the NLRA. Justice Powell does agree, however, that prior to the Taft-Hartley
Amendment in 1947, all of the Board's decisions on managerial employees dealt
only with their exclusion from rank and file units. See 416 U.S. at 282 n.14.
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nal rule of statutory construction-reference to the words of
the statute itself.3 09 As Justice White's dissent observed, the
Act by definition applies to any employee.31 0 Where Congress
intended to exclude certain classes of employees, such as supervisors, from the Act's coverage, it did so in an enumerated
exception to the statutory definition. Relying on accepted principles of statutory construction, 3 11 Justice White correctly argued that because neither the Act nor its legislative history
contains any language to the contrary, Congress did not intend
31 2
to exclude managerial employees from the Act's coverage.
The Court should therefore have deferred to Congress's implicit inclusion of managerial employees within the statutory
definition. Moreover, Justice Powell's three factors supporting
the exclusion of managerial employees are not persuasive.
First, the Board's relevant decisions regarding managerial employees do not represent a longstanding administrative interpretation requiring exclusion. Justice Powell acknowledged
that until the passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments all
of the Board's decisions on managerial employees dealt only
with the issue of whether they should be excluded from rank
and file units.313 The Board never stated prior to the Taft-Hartley Amendments that managers were not entitled to the protection of the Act in an appropriate unit. Since 1947, the Board
has held in only two cases-American Locomotive Co.314 and
Swift & Co. 3 1-9-thatmanagerial employees were not entitled to
the protections of the Act. Swift was overruled by the Board in
1970 in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative,InC. 3 1 6 There the
NLRB noted that "the 'managerial employee' category is Board
309. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.01 (4th
ed.1973) (a revision of the third edition of Sutherland Statutory Construction).
310. 416 U.S. at 307 n.3. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (1976).
311. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius "operates as a double
negative to produce the opposite of its usual exclusionary effect in the case of
exceptions, provisos, saving clauses or other negative provisions. The enumeration of exclusions from the operation of a statute indicates that it should apply
to all cases not specifically excluded." 2A C. SANDS, supra note 309, at § 47.23.

312. 416 U.S. at 304.
313. Id. at 275-77. For a list of the cases relied on by Justice Powell, see
notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text.
314. 92 N.LR.B. 115, 116-17 (1950) (buyers).
315. 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1956) (procurement drivers).
Other post-1947 cases cited by Powell, 416 U.S. at 285-87, held that the employees at issue were not managers or were managers and therefore excluded
from rank and file units. Compare Justice Powell's analysis of these cases, id.,
with that of Justice White, id. at 308-10.
316. 185 N.L.RLB. 550 (1970).
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created, not established by the Act."317 This decision limited
the managerial exclusion to cases where there was "an inconsistency or conflict of interest between [the employee's] performance of his job and the implementation of his right to
engage in or refrain from engaging in concerted activity."318
From 1970 until the decision in Bell Aerospace the Board did
not qualify its North Arkansas holding that, with a limited exception, managerial employees were entitled to coverage.
Thus, the requirements of Justice Powell's first factor were not
satisfied, and the Court should have deferred to the Board's
interpretation. 19
Justice Powell's second factor, congressional reenactment
without change, is normally entitled to little weight in statutory
interpretation. 320 Among the many reasons for congressional
inaction are the political difficulties associated with attempts to
amend the NLRA.321 In addition, Justice Powell does not
clearly indicate which reenactment he is discussing. In 1947,
Congress specifically excluded only supervisors.3 22 The 1959
Labor Management and Reporting Act "dealt with secondary
boycotts and picketing, and... nothing suggest[ed] that the
attention of Congress at that time was directed to or focused on
the question whether managerial employees were covered or
excluded in the statute." 323 In 1974, the Health Care Amendments deleted the exclusion of private nonprofit hospitals from
the section 2(2) definition of employer and added sections relating to nonprofit hospitals. Actually, the legislative history of
the 1974 Health Care Amendments indicates that Congress ac324
cepted the Board's inclusion of professional employees.
Finally, Justice Powell used Taft-Hartley's exclusion of supervisors to document a legislative intent to exclude managerial employees. 325 As previously demonstrated, 32 6 however, the
Conference Committee intentionally narrowed the definition of
supervisor to avoid this result. Justice Powell consistently misused the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments. Although the 1947 Congress was generally conservative,
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
See notes 273-81 supra and accompanying text.
2A C. SANDs, supra note 309, at § 49.10.
Note, supra note 296, at 987-89.
See note 245 supra and accompanying text.
416 U.S. at 310 (White, J., dissenting in part).
See note 387 infra and accompanying text.
416 U.S. at 279-83.
See notes 250-51 supra and accompanying text.
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the House was clearly more promanagment than the Senate.
The House bill would have excluded under the definition of supervisor several categories of employees not excluded under
the Senate bill. In conference, the House version was rejected,
and the carefully tailored Senate definition of an excluded supervisor was enacted. 327 Nonetheless, Justice Powell relies almost totally on the House bill, which was not enacted, and the
House report supporting the bill which was not enacted. 28 To
support his economic views, Justice Powell cited extensively
from Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion regarding supervisors in the Packard case. 3 2 9 Congress, however, considered
that opinion when it enacted the specific exclusion of
supervisors.
Justice Powell cited330 the House's definition of confidential
employees, rejected in conference, in support of his own nonstatutory definition excluding all managerial employees. Under
the House definition, all employees privy to any nonpublic information "of a confidential nature" 331 would have been excluded from the Act. Prior Board decisions, however, did not
support the exclusion of confidential employees who had access to information unrelated to the employer's labor relations
policies. 332 In Ford Motor Co., the Board clearly explained its
prior decisions and narrowed its definition of confidential employee even within the category of those with access to labor
relations information. 333 Justice Powell misread the Board's
decisions and the intent of Congress when he stated:
In 1946 in Ford Motor Co.,. . . the Board had narrowed its definition of
"confidential employees" to embrace only those who exercised "'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations." The discussion of "con-

fidential employees" in both the House and Conference Committee
327. See id.
328. 416 U.S. at 279-84.
329. Id. at 278-79.
330. Id. at 283 n.12.
331. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (c) (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATrVE HIsTORY, supra note 235, at 168.
332. See note 197 supra.
333. We have also excluded from units of rank and file employees persons who, in the regular course of their duties, have access to confidential data bearing directly upon the employees' labor relations,
designating them as "confidential." However, upon reappraisal, we are
of the opinion that this definition is too inclusive and needlessly precludes many employees from barginaing collectively together with

other workers having common interests. Consequently, it is our intention to limit the term "confidential" so as to embrace only those employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who
exercise "managerial" functions in the field of labor relations.
66 NL.IR.B. at 1322.
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Reports, however, unmistakably refers to that term as defined in the
House bill, which was not limited just to those in "labor relations."
Thus, although Congress may have misconstrued recent Board practice, it clearly thought that the Act did not cover334"confidential employees" even under a broad definition of that term.
Justice Powell's characterization of these authorities is disingenuous. His citation to Board decisions excluding managerial employees from rank and file units 335 demonstrates his
awareness of the Board's requirement of a labor relations
nexus for exclusion of confidential employees. 336 Justice Pow-

ell's reliance on the House Report is similarly misplaced.
There are five references in the legislative history of the TaftHartley Amendments to "confidential employee": one in the
338
House bill as reported,337 one in the House bill as passed,
two in the House Report,339 and one in the Conference Report.340 The Conference Report is the only source which deals

with the legislation actually enacted. 341 Justice Powell, however, adopted the House bill's discarded definition. Thus, by
misreading the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments and misstating prior Board decisions, Justice Powell justified the exclusion of all managerial employees and laid the
groundwork for the exclusion of large groups of white-collar

employees. Most professionals have confidential information
about clients that is "not available to the public, to competitors,
or to employees generally." 342 Many, if not most, secretaries,
an underpaid and largely unrepresented group, also have ac334. 416 U.s. at 1283 n.12 (citation omitted).
335. Id. at 276.
336. In Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.RJB. 509 (1944), the Board said:
Although it appears that the work of the employees hereinabove
discussed has its confidential aspects, it is not concerned with labor relations. The possession of information which the Company regards as
secret, however, is not of itself sufficient to justify depriving these employees of the right to collective bargaining. We shall, in accordance
with our usual practice, include these employees within the unit.
Id. at 511. Accord, Barrett Division, Allied Chem. &Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903,
905 (1946).
337. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (c) (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATrn HISTORY, supra note 235, at 41. See note 247 supra for exact language.
338. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 2(12) (c), 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in LEGisLATIvF ISTORY, supra note 235, at 168. The language in the House bill as reported and as passed is the same. See note 247 supra.
339. HR. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATivE Hisvoy, supra note 235, at 307-08, 314. See note 249 supra for exact
language.
340. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 570, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1947), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 235, at 539-40. See note 250 supra and accompanying text for exact language.
341. See note 250-51 supra and accompanying text.
342. 416 U.S. at 283 n.12.
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cess to such information. 343
The Supreme Court recently rejected Justice Powell's dictum in NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corporation.344 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
stated that the Bell Aerospace footnote was "error... in light
...of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act."345 Justice
Brennan noted that "the Taft-Hartley Act's express inclusion of
'professional employees' under the Act's coverage negates any
reading of the legislative history as excluding confidential employees generally from the definition of employee in § 2(3)."34
The decision removes an obstacle that had presented substantial problems to professional organization under the Act.
B.

THE "INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT" TEST

1. Derivationof the Test
During the last two decades the Board dealt with large
numbers of representation petitions from employed professionals. Consequently, it faced the tension 347 created by the Taft343. For discussions of attempts of secretaries to organize, see Women's
Group Set to Organize Office Workers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 1,
Groups Seek to End Wage Lag of Women, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1980, § 1, at 28,
col. 1. See also note 7 supra.
344. 102 S. Ct. 216 (1981). The NLRB has, since the 1946 Ford Motor Co. decision, consistently defined "confidential employees" as those who "assist and
act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in
the field of labor relations." Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. at 1322. See also B.F.
Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956). Other circuit courts reviewing the
Board's definition have accepted it. See Union Oil Co. of Calif., Inc. v. NLRB,
607 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Allied Prods. Corp., Richard Bros. Div., 548
F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1977). Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit, relying on Justice
Powell's dictum in Bell Aerospace, had used the wording of discarded H.R. 3020
to give a broad construction of "confidential employees." Hendricks County
Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 25, 30 (7th Cir. 1979) rev'd, 102
S. Ct. 216 (1981).
345. 102 S. Ct. at 227.
346. Id. at 225.
347. This tension was noted in both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Yeshiva. Justice Powell in his majority opinion stated: 'There may be some
tension between the Act's exclusion of managerial employees and its inclusion
of professionals, since most professionals in managerial positions continue to
draw on their special skills and training." 444 U.S. at 686.
Justice Brennan in his dissent noted:
Indeed, the statute evidences significant tension as to congressional intent in this respect by its explicit inclusion, on the one hand, of "professional employees" under § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12), and its
exlusion, on the other, of "supervisors" under § 2(11), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11). Similarly, when transplanted to the academic arena, the
Act's extension of coverage to professionals under § 2(12) cannot easily
be squared with the Board-created exclusion of "managerial employees" in the industrial context.
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Hartley Amendments' specific inclusion of professional employees 348 and specific exclusion of supervisors. 34 9 Both the
section 2(11) definition of excluded supervisors and the section
2(12) definition of included professionals use the term "judgment". Excluded supervisors use "independent judgment";350
included professionals "consistent [ly] exercise ... discretion
and judgment."35 ' The tension between these two sections of
the statute, however, is minor when compared with the tension
between the statutory definition of a professional as an "employee engaged in work ... predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental ... work...

[and] involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance," 352 and the nonstatutory exclusion of
managerial employees, defined as "those who formulate and effectuate management policies .

.

. and who have discretion in

the performance of their jobs independent of their employer's
3 53
established policy."
The Board, using basic concepts of statutory construction,3 54 sought to reconcile the specific statutory inclusion of
professionals with the specific statutory exclusion of supervisors and the nonstatutory exclusion of managers. Unless inter-

preted carefully to effectuate the Act's purposes 3 55 and to
recognize Congress's express intent to include professionals,
the exclusions could deprive all or almost all professional employees of the Act's protections. 356 The Board resolved the tensions by recognizing, in both the university cases 357 and other
444 U.S. at 692 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (12)
(1976). See notes 254-63, supra and accompanying text.
349. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(1976). See notes 244-50 supra and accompanying text.
350. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(1976).
351. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)
(1976).
352. Id.
353. Bell Aerospace Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (1975). See also General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.LR.] . 851, 857 (1974).
354. "A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant,
and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error." 2A C. SANDs, supra note 309, at § 46.06.
355. See notes 183-84 supra and accompanying text.
356. See ManagerialEmployee, supra note 118, at 439.
357. Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); University of Miami, 213
N.L.R.B. 634 (1974).
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cases 35 8 involving professional employees, that such employees

normally operate under dual authority structures: a hierarchical, bureaucratic management structure and a coarchical, professional structure. The Board's specific solution to the
problem was the independent professional-judgment test,
which provides that employees exercising their independent
professional judgment are not excluded supervisors.
The Board developed three arguments supporting its determination that faculty members were neither supervisors nor
managers: "(i) [F] aculty authority is collective, (ii) it is exercised in the faculty's own interest rather than in the interest of
the university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board of
trustees."359 All three justifications help to reconcile the tension inherent in the statutory inclusion of professionals, the
statutory exclusion of supervisors, and the nonstatutory exclusion of managers. Moreover, the Board's interpretation, developed over years of dealing with professional units, is consistent
with the wording of the supervisory exclusion and the reality of
dual authority structures. 360 The statutory definition of supervisor includes "any individual." On its face, and consistent
with the coarchical, collegial methods of professionals, this definition would not include professional group decision making
and recommendations because such activities are conducted
collectively, not individually.361 Furthermore, the definition requires the exercise of authority "in the interest of the employer."362 Professional judgment is concerned primarily with
quality, not quantity or costs. Professionals exercise authority
in the interest of quality, which may not always be the employer's primary interest. Finally, under the dual authority systems existing for many employed professionals, the collective
authority they wield is subject to final managerial authority ex363
ercised in the interest of the employer.
358. General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1975); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 723 (1967), enforced, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970).
359. 444 U.S. at 685 (citing Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 250 (1975);
University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 634 (1974)). This was the rationale the
Board used to decide Yeshiva. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
360. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(1976). See note 245 supra and accompanying text.
361. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(1976).
362. Id.
363. In Yeshiva, Justice Powell claimed that "the Board's lawyers have
abandoned the first and third branches of this analysis, which in any event
were flatly inconsistent with its precedents, and have transformed the second
into a theory [the "independent professional judgment" test] that does not ap-
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2. Application of the Test
The Board was first presented with a representation petition requesting a unit of university professors in the 1971 case
of C. W. Post Center of Long Island University.364 The employer
argued for the exclusion of all faculty members from the Act on
the ground that they were all supervisors or managers. Thus,
the Board dealt with the tension created by the specific statutory inclusion of professionals and the specific statutory exclusion of supervisors and the nonstatutory category of managers.
The Board rejected the employer's contention because faculty
members who effectively recommend action on matters which
the Board would normally consider to be managerial did not
3 65
exercise their authority individually but rather collectively.
Acknowledging that it was dealing with an employment relationship largely outside its prior experience, the Board observed that "the policymaking and quasi-supervisory authority
which adheres to full-time faculty status but is exercised by
them only as a group does not make them supervisors within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, or managerial employees who must be separately represented."3 66 The Board did exclude deans and department chairpersons because they
individually had supervisory authority.367 In later cases, the
Board continued to demonstrate a sophisticated understanding
of the problems raised by the application of the NLRA to the
coarchical, collegial structure of professional relationships in a
university setting as opposed to its application to the hierarchipear in any Board opinion." 444 U.S. at 685. Despite this statement, he admits
that the Board preserved the first and third points in its brief. Id. at 685 n.20.
The "independent professional judgment" test is inherent in the Board's entire
approach to professional unionization and to all three branches of its rationale.
Contrary to Justice Powell's contention that the Board had invented the "independent professional judgment" test on appeal before the Supreme Court in
Yeshiva, it was a consistent and rational test which the Board developed and
applied in over ten years of dealing with the novel issues involved in faculty
and other professional unionization cases. See notes 364-69 infra and accompanying text. The Board originally applied it in cases involving professional engineers. See notes 370-86 infra and accompanying text. The legislative history of
the 1974 Health Care Amendments indicates that Congress approved the test,
and it has since also been applied to professionals working in the health care
industry. See note 387 infra.
364. 189 N.LR.B. 904 (1971).
365. Id. at 905.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 906. Board decisions regarding chairpersons have varied depending on the degree of individual authority they possessed. See, e.g., Trustees of
Boston Univ., 235 N.L.RB. 1233 (1978), enforced, 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978), cert
granted,judgment vacated, case remandedfor further considerationin light of
Yeshiva, 445 U.S. 912 (1980). See notes 395-98 infra and accompanying text.

1982]

PROFESSIONALS AND UNIONIZATION

cal, bureaucratic structure of the traditional pyramidal indus9
trial setting.3 68 Thus, when the Board decided the Yeshiva36
case in 1975, it was fully familiar with the workings of universities and the relationship between the rank and file employees
of the higher education industry, the professors, and their
employer.
Like university professors, professional engineers work
under dual authority structures, one hierarchical and bureaucratic and the other coarchical and collegial.370 The Board has
consistently found that engineers holding positions in the hierarchical, bureaucratic structure are supervisors or managers,
but those in the coarchical, collegial professional structure are
not unless they individually exercise supervisory or managerial
authority.37 1 At issue in Westinghouse Electric Corp.3 72 was the
status of six manufacturing engineers who determined whether
and at what cost a product could be manufactured, and then
oversaw its production. Although they had no authority to
3 73
change or stop operations, they could recommend changes.
The Board refused to preclude the manufacturing engineers
from organizing in a professional unit, reasoning that the engineers' advisory duties were common to all professional employees.3 74 The Board indicated that only an extraordinary alliance
368. In Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972), the Board recognized and
gave effect to collegial principles despite its statement that "[blecause authority vested in one's peers, acting as a group, simply would not conform to the
pattern for which the supervisory exclusion of our Act was designed, a genuine
system of collegiality would tend to confound us." Id. at 648. In its decision in
New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973), the next year, it explained, "Adelphi
does not imply that the exercise of true collegial authority would divest a
faculty of coverage by the Act .... That decision merely noted that certain
difficulties might be attendant upon applying the Act to a true collegial system." Id. at 5.
369. 221 N.LR.B. 1053 (1975).
370. See General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.LR.B. 851, 855-56 (1974).
371. See notes 377-87 infra and accompanying text.
372. 113 N.L.R.B. 337 (1955).
373. Id. at 338.
374. The Board stated:
While manufacturing engineers make recommendations on matters
which are of great importance to management, that factor is usually
present in the work of all professional employees, and does not in and
of itself make them part of management so as to preclude their inclusion in a professional unit. Indeed, this common factor, in our opinion,
was one of the reasons why Congress specifically provided for the establishment of separate professional units. To justify the exclusion of
individuals otherwise qualified for inclusion in a professional unit upon
the ground that they are too closely allied to the employer to be regarded as employees under the Act, we believe that it must be established that the individuals in question have interests and duties not
shared by the other professionally engaged employees.
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with management would justify the exclusion of otherwise
qualified professional employees from an appropriate bargainig unit. 375 Later, the Board affirmed this rationale in a 1967
case involving the same employer.37 6
In the leading case of General Dynamics Corp.,377 the em-

ployees at issue were over 1,000 senior engineering and scientific employees3 7 8 who at different times acted as proposal
managers,3 79 proposal team members, 380 and project leaders. 38 1
Id. at 339-40.
375. Id. at 340.

376. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 723 (1967), enforced, 424 F.2d
1151 (7th Cir. 1970), the Board again drew a distinction between the type of supervision and discretion used by professionals and that invoking supervisory or
managerial status. After carefully examining the jobs of the engineers at issue,
id. at 724-25, the Board concluded:
We are persuaded, rather, that the duties and responsibilities engineers perform in such capacities are basically professional in nature. It
is true, of course, that proper performance of all such engineering work
requires a high degree of technical competence and the use of independent judgment with respect to matters of importance to the Employer's financial and other managerial interests. But such
characteristics are typical of the work which Section 2(12) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, defines as "Professional" work.
Id. at 726 (footnote omitted). The Board determined that certain engineers assigned as leadmen "also have certain special duties and responsibilities, vis-avis the craftsmen employed by the Employer for the project work, that are
clearly supervisory in character." Id. They were to be exluded from the unit
only if they spent over fifty percent of their time in such a supervisory position.
Id. at 727.
In Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, 192 N.LR.B. 920 (1971), the employer was
a partnership providing architectural and engineering services. The employees
at issue were project managers having day-to-day responsibility for projects,
and job captains having responsibility for the architectural working drawings
and for coordinating engineering drawings. Although the Board found that
both groups of employees had "some discretion in assigning work and [were]
professionally responsible for the quality of work performed on a project to
which they [were] assigned," it concluded that the members of neither group
were supervisors within the meaning of the Act, "but merely provide[d] professional direction and coordination for other professional employees." Id. at 921.
Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N..R.B. 1049 (1971), decided within a
few days of Skidmore, similarly involved the status of project designers and job
captains in an architectural firm where work on projects was organized on a
team basis. Id. at 1051. The Board concluded that the employees at issue were
not supervisors: "Although they responsibly direct[ed] other employees, it
[was] in a professional sense and related only to a particular project." Id.
377. 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974).
378. Id. at 855.
379. Proposal managers had "total responsibility" for the proposal effort.
The proposal managers first selected their own "team[s] of varied engineering
and administrative disciplines" and then "'assign [ed]' tasks to the team members whose work [they 'direct[ed]']." Id. at 856.
380. "Each team member, in turn, [selected] his own team of engineering
and administrative disciplines ... to whom he also [gave] 'work assignment
and direction."' Id.
381. A project leader who had total responsibility for the entire assignment
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In a long and carefully drafted opinion, the Board again drew a
distinction between professional and managerial or supervisory
discretion and judgment.382 Despite the vast powers of the senior engineers who functioned as proposal managers, proposal
team members, and project leaders, the Board found that they
were neither managers nor supervisors. 383 The employees
were not managers since they did not create or implement
management policies or "have discretion in their job perform384
ance independent of their Employer's established policy."
The Board observed that their "[e]mployer's established policy
[was] based on directional change rather than on status
quo." 385 Furthermore, the Board found they were not excludable as supervisors because the limited discretion they exercised was "directly related to a professional responsibility for
the quality of work performed on the projects to which they
[were] assigned. They merely [were] providing professional
direction and coordination primarily for other professional employees." 386 Recognizing the dual authority structures under
which professionals operate, the Board concluded that the authority and discretion possessed by professionals and the direction which they provided was exercised in conformity with
their independent professional judgment and not in a traditional managerial or supervisory sense.
Recent legislation indicates that Congress has granted its
imprimatur to the independent professional judgment test. In
1974, Congress amended the NLRA to delete the nonprofit hospital exclusion from the Act. The Health Care Amendments
brought the large number of professional employees in the
3
health industry within the the Act. 87
was assigned to implement the proposal. Duties of the project leader included
setting out scheduling, initially determining budget requirements, and establishing the size and composition of the required work force. The project leader
then gave assignments to the project team members. Removal of any discipline
from the group was also within the power of the project leader. Id.
382. Id. at 857-58.
383. Id. at 858.
384. Id.

385. Id.
386. Id. at 858-59.
387. Congress was concerned that many professionals, however, would be
excluded from the Act's coverage as supervisors on the basis of their professional supervision. Both houses recognized that the exercise of professional
judgment is not the exercise of supervisory authority.
Various organizations representing health care professionals have
urged an amendment to Section 2(11) of the Act so as to exclude such
professionals from the definition of "supervisor". The Committee has
studied this definition with particular reference to health care profes-
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C. THE JuDiciAL RESPONSE TO FACULTY UNIONIZATION
1. The Courts of Appeals
Only three courts of appeals cases have discussed faculty

unionization under the NLRA. The First Circuit in NLRB v.
Wentworth Institute38 8 and Trustees of Boston University v.
NLRB389 enforced the Board's orders. The Second Circuit in
NLRB v. Yeshiva University3 9 0 did not.
In Wentworth, the Board, in keeping with its prior decisions, rejected the employer's contention that all faculty were
supervisors or managers. 391 Wentworth may have presented a
unique fact situation because it did not seem to be a typical
mature college.3 92 It operated a two-year engineering technology program at an "Institute" with about one hundred faculty
members and a third and fourth year program leading to a B.S.
degree at a smaller "College" with about fourteen full-time
faculty members. All faculty were employed under one-year
contracts. The First Circuit sustained the Board's finding that
the faculty were neither supervisors nor managers but stated
that in the future it would "focus... upon each particular institution." 393 Nevertheless, the holding of Wentworth may be
broader than it appears since the faculty participated in the institution's governance through a faculty senate.394
sionals, such as registered nurses, interns, residents, fellows, and salaried physicians and concludes that the proposed amendment is
unnecessary because of existing Board decisions. The Committee
notes that the Board has carefully avoided applying the definition of
"supervisor" to a health care professional who gives direction to other
employees in the exercise of professional judgment, which direction is
incidental to the professional's treatment of patients, and thus is not
the exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of the employer.
The Committee expects the Board to continue evaluating the facts
of each case in this manner when making its determinations.
S. REP. No. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3951. The Board has continued to apply the "independent professional judgment" test in the health care field. See, e.g., NLRB v. St. Francis
Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 420-22 (9th Cir. 1979) (assistant head nurses not
excluded as supervisors); Methodist Home v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (4th
Cir. 1979) (charge nurses not excluded as supervisors).
388. 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975).
389. 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted, vacated,remandedfor further
consideration in light of Yeshiva, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
390. 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978) (denying enforcement of 221 N.L.R.B. 1053
(1975)).
391. 210 N.L.R.B. 345 (1973).
392. The term "mature" college was first used by Matthew Finkin, former
Associate Counsel to AAUP, to describe college and universities with "dualtrack" decisional systems. See Finkin, supra note 127, at 615.
393. 515 F.2d at 556.

394. Id. at 552.
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In Trustees of Boston University, the employer claimed
only department chairpersons should be excluded as supervisors or managers. 3 95 The court, deferring to the expertise of
the administrative agency,3 96 said, "the Board was entitled to
find that the chairperson's recommendations were not 'effective' or that he/she was acting in the 'interest' of the faculty,
not of the employer." 397 If the court was prepared to recognize
an "independent professional judgment" rationale for the inclusion of chairpersons at a mature university, the same rationale
would certainly be applicable to faculty members. In fact, the
court clearly stated that "the selection process for department
chairpersons is such that they represent the interests of the
tenured professors of the department rather than the

University."

98

In 1974, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association filed a
representation petition with the Board seeking an election in a
unit composed of the full-time faculty members at ten of
Yeshiva University's thirteen schools. 3 99 The University raised
the basic argument, long thought settled, that all faculty members were supervisors or managers. The Board held hearings
on the issue for five months, compiling an extensive record.40 0
In its opinion it cited its prior decisions on the issue,40 1 and
dealt with the issue succinctly, stating that
the role and authority of the faculty ... with respect to hiring, promotion, salary increases, the granting of tenure, and other areas of govern395. 575 F.2d at 302.
396. Id. at 305.
397. Id. at 306.
398. Id.
399. 444 U.S. at 674-75.
400. Id. at 696 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Both the opinion of the Second
Circuit denying enforcement, 582 F.2d at 688, and the opinion of the Supreme
Court affirming the Second Circuit, 444 U.S. at 691, extensively outlined the internal organization of Yeshiva University, citing facts indicating involvement by
the faculty in the schooPs administration and acceptance of the faculty's recommendations. This was a one-sided reading of the voluminous record compiled by the Board. The Yeshiva University Faculty Association's petition for
certiorari outlined numerous instances where the administration acted contrary to the desires of the faculty. Benson, To Bargainor Govern The Impact
of Yeshiva on Private and Public Sector Collective Bargainingin Higher Education, 7 Omo N.U.L. REV. 259, 269 n.76 (1980). See also Brief for IntervenorPetitioner at 24-26, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978). Yeshiva
had no university senate. This was one indication that Yeshiva was not a "mature" university where the faculty had a substantial voice in governing the institution, 444 U.S. at 676.
401. 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 n.5 (1975) (citing Northeastern Univ., 218
NJ.R.B. 247 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N.LLB. 634 (1974); Adelphi Univ.,
195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971); C.W. Post
Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.LR.B. 904 (1971)).
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ance are not significantly different from what they were in the cited
cases, wherein the same arguments were rejected. At Yeshiva University, faculty participation in collegial decision making is on a collective
rather than individual basis, it is exercised in the faculty's own interest
rather than "in the interest of the employer," and final authority rests
with the board of trustees. As in the ealier decisions, we find that the
enfaculty members are professional employees under the Act who 4are
02
titled to vote for or against collective-bargaining representation.

The opinion of the Second Circuit, written by Judge Mulligan, 40 3 granted little deference to the NLRB's role as fact-finder
or its role as the administrative agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of the National Labor Relations
Act.404 Noting "the tension between exclusion from the Act of
supervisors under section 2(11) and the inclusion of professional employees under section 2(12),"405 and "concedfing]
that if read literally the statutory definition [of section 2(11)]
can be construed not to cover the full-time faculty," 406 Judge
Mulligan nevertheless concluded that "this Board interpretation is not the only reasonable reading of the language of section 2(11)."407
Given normal standards of judicial deference to the decisions of an administrative agency, the especially high standards of deference due a Board decision in the representation
area,4 08 and Congress's failure to consider the application of the
Act in a university setting,40 9 one would have expected the
court to defer to the Board's reasonable and literal resolution
of the tension between the two sections. Judge Mulligan did
not defer to the Board, however. Refusing to decide the case
on the basis of the specific statutory exclusion of supervisors,
in one short paragraph he ruled that faculty came under the
402. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054 (footnotes omitted).
403. 582 F.2d at 688. William H. Mulligan was Dean of Fordham Law School
from 1956 to 1971. WHo's WHO IN AMERICA 2400 (41st ed. 1980). Thus, he was
Dean in 1971 when the AAUP sought to unionize the faculty at Fordham. The
Law School was excluded from the overall unit, but an independent union, the
Law School Bargaining Committee, sought to represent a separate unit of fulltime and regular part-time faculty of the Law School. Fordham Univ., 193
NLRB 134, 134 (1971). The Board approved both units and directed elections.
Id. at 140. The university and Judge Mulligan as Dean of the Law School had
opposed the petitions on the grounds that all faculty members were supervisors. Id. at 134.
404. See, e.g., 582 F.2d at 698-700.
405. Id. at 695 n.10.
406. Id. at 699.
407. Id.
408. See text accompanying notes 273-81 supra.
409. Judge Mulligan recognized that "[t]he history of section 2(11) indicates that such collective supervision simply was not actively considered by
Congress at the time." 582 F.2d at 699.
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nonstatutory exclusion of managers. 4 10 In support of his conclusion, he cited Bell Aerospace,41 1 and three inapposite Board
decisions excluding employee-shareholders of corporations

from bargaining

units.412

Judge Mulligan relied on an out of date view of the nature
of a university and its relationship to its faculty. Rather than
recognizing the size and impact of the education industry today
and the changed circumstances of faculty within the university
context, Judge Mulligan preferred to quote Justice Cardozo's
1925 opinion in Hamburger v. Cornell University. Cardozo
stated: "By practice and tradition the members of the faculty
are masters not servants .... They have the independence appropriate to a company of scholars." 413 Whatever the relevance
of Justice Cardozo's statement to the decision of the 1925 case,
4 14
it would not be applicable if the same case arose today.
2. The Supreme Court-Yeshiva
Yeshiva was decided by a five-to-four vote of the Supreme
Court, with Justice Powell writing the majority opinion 415 and
410. We need not resolve this point, however, since there is no such "individual" statutory restriction in the Board's own concept of "managerial employees." In fact, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Division of
Textron, Inc. . . . the managerial personnel found not to be within the
collective bargaining unit exercised their managerial functions as a
"team." Logically, we see no reason that the fact that the policies of a
company are created by a group (as indeed they usually are by the
Board of Directors) rather than by an individual should be of significance in determining whether an individual has managerial status, and
the Board has advanced no satisfactory rationale for the weight it has
given this factor.
Id. at 699-700 (footnote and citations omitted).
411. Id. at 699. Bell Aerospace, however, did not discuss this point. The
Supreme Court noted briefly that, among the other duties performed individually, the buyers at issue in Bell Aerospace also "serve[d as team [chairmen]
and sign[ed] the purchase order" for the company's Minute Man missile project. 416 U.S. at 270. It did not discuss the relevance of this observation anywhere in the opinion.
412. 582 F.2d at 699 n.15 (citing Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195
(1971); Red & White Airway Cab Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 83, 85 (1959); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 798 (1952)).
413. 582 F.2d at 698 (citing Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 240 N.Y. 328, 336-37,
148 N.E. 539, 541 (1925)).
414.

See note 123 supra.

415. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens. See generally Benson, supra
note 400; Bethel, Private University Professors and NLRB v. Yeshiva: The Second Circuit's Misconception of Shared Authority and Supervisory Status, 44
Mo. L. REv. 427 (1979); Fenton, University Faculty and the Institutionof Collective Bargaining,69 Ky. L.J. 37 (1980); Grenig, supra note 283; Menard &Morrill,
Are Faculty Members Scholarsor Managers? The Yeshiva Case, 30 LAB.LJ.754
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Justice Brennan writing the dissent.416 Both the majority opinion and the dissent recognized the tension between the Act's
inclusion of professionals and the exclusion of supervisors and
managers; 417 both recognized that the status of university
4 18
professors was an issue which Congress had not considered;
and both recognized that the coarchical, collegial authority
structure of a university was totally unlike the hierarchical, bureaucratic structure traditionally found in the industrial sector. 4 19 The two opinions, however, contain significantly
different views of the role of judicial review in an administrative law context and the role of faculty members within the realities of American higher education.
The majority affirmed the Second Circuit's opinion, refusing to sustain the Board's representation decision. It labeled
the issue "a mixed one of fact and law,"420 claimed the Board
had made no findings of fact,4 21 and found no reason to reject
the "different view" of the court of appeals. 42 2 The dissent, applying normal standards of judicial review 42 3 and noting the
(1979); Ripps, The Professor as Manager in the Academic Enterprise, 29 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 17 (1980).
416. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackman. 444 U.S. at 691.
417. See note 347 supra.
418. 444 U.S. at 679-80 (Powell, J.); id. at 692 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
419. Justice Powell acknowledged that modern universities are characterized by a system of shared authority evolving "from the medieval model of collegial decisionmaking." Id. at 680. For this reason he concluded that the
statutory scheme of the NLRA was ill-suited to university faculties' organization attempts. Id. at 680-81. Justice Brennan's dissent also recognized that faculties operate collegially within the university's dual authority structure. Id. at
696-98. He emphasized that this arrangement was "fu]nlike the purely hierarchical decisionmaking structure that prevails in the typical industrial organization." Id. at 696. Justice Brennan recognized, however, that the faculty
exercised a merely advisory role regarding fiscal or managerial matters. Id. at
697.
420. 444 U.S. at 691.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Primary authority to resolve these conflicts and to adapt the Act to
the changing patterns of industrial relations was entrusted to the
Board, not to the judiciary. The Court has often admonished that
"[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate
interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national
labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the
Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board,
subject to limited judicial review." Through its cumulative experience
in dealing with labor-management relations in a variety of industrial
and nonindustrial settings, it is the Board that has developed the expertise to determine whether coverage of a particular category of employees would further the objectives of the Act. And through its
continuous oversight of industrial conditions, it is the Board that is
best able to formulate and adjust national labor policy to conform to
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Board's extensive experience in the university context 424 and
the voluminous record in the Yeshiva case itself,425 deferred to
the Board's decision as "neither irrational nor inconsistent with
the Act.' 426 The dissent also questioned the majority's assertion that the interests of the faculty and the administration
were congruent. It cited numerous instances of disagreement
between the two,427 noting that "[t]he university administration has certain economic and fiduciary responsibilities that are
not shared by the faculty, whose primary concerns are academic and related solely to its own professional reputation. 428
The dissent buttressed this contention, observing that education had become a big business,42 9 that professional administrators had replaced academic professionals, and that financial
difficulties had tended to erode traditional faculty prerogatives
43 0
and security.
Although the majority noted that the administration had
vetoed faculty recommendations due to fiscal concerns, it dismissed such economic realities as "in no way detract [ing] from
the institution's primary concern with the academic responsibilities entrusted to the faculty." 43 1 Ignoring the political realities of university life, the majority believed that it was dealing
with a "system of 'shared authority' evolved from the medieval
model of collegial decisionmaking in which guilds of scholars
were responsible only to themselves." 432 The majority stated
that "traditional systems of collegiality and tenure insulate the
professor from some of the sanctions applied to an industrial
manager who fails to adhere to company policy."433 In response to this assertion, the dissent offered a substantially different characterization of university life.434
the realities of industrial life. Accordingly, the judicial role is limited; a
court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. The
Board's decision may be reviewed for its rationality and its consistency
with the Act, but once these criteria are satisfied, the order must be
enforced.
Id. at 692-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted). See text
accompanying notes 273-97 .-upra.
424. 444 U.S. at 692.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 696.
427. Id. at 701-02.
428. Id. at 701.
429. Id. at 703.

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

703-04.
688 n.27.
680.
689.
702-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In addition to Justice Powell's questionable conclusions regarding judicial review of Board decisions and the role of the
faculty within the university, the majority opinion violates one
of the elementary rules of statutory construction. Statutory
analysis generally begins with an examination of the language
of the statute itself.435 The NLRA contains a broad definition of
employee 436 and a narrow, specifically defined exclusion of supervisors. 437 Instead of determining how university professors
fit within these statutory definitions, Justice Powell found that
they were excluded under his own judicially created, nonstatutory definition of managerial employees developed in Bell Aerospace. In that case, Justice Powell rejected the Board's narrow
definition of managerial employee in favor of a more expansive
reading of the phrase. 438 Justice Powell relied on this easily expandable definition again in Yeshiva.
Although he purported to decide the case under the managerial, not the supervisory, exclusion, Justice Powell attempted
to bolster his position by stating that "[t]he Board has held repeatedly that professionals may be excluded as supervisors." 43 9
In support, he cited two cases. 440 The Board in University of
Vermont 44 1 approved a unit of all full-time university faculty
members, but excluded department chairpersons because they
individually exercised supervisory authority.442 In Presbyterian
Medical Center,443 the employer hospital objected to the inclusion of head nurses, charge nurses, and team leaders in a unit
of registered nurses sought by the Colorado Nurses' Association. The Board excluded head nurses on the ground that they
individually exercised supervisory authority,44 4 but included
charge nurses and team leaders445 because "their duties are
generally limited to giving directions in the performance of
their professional duties and, as such, are not responsibilities
435. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 309, at § 47.01.
436. Labor Management Relations
§ 152(3) (1976).

(Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C.

437. Id. § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
438. 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974). See notes 304-43 supra and accompanying text.
439. 444 U.S. at 682 n.13.

440. Id.

441. 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976).
442. "The record shows that the recommendations of the chairmen based
upon these evaluations are highly effective in determining promotions, tenure,
reappointments, and salary increases, and are generally accepted without question by the university authorities." Id. at 426.
443. 218 N.L.R.B. 1266 (1975).
444. Id. at 1268.
445. These employees operated in the collegial fashion typical of professionals. Id.
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considered supervisory within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act."44 6 Thus, the cases cited by Justice Powell do not support the exclusion of all university faculty members as supervisors, but only those who individually wield supervisory
authority. Justice Powell, by refusing to decide Yeshiva under
the specific supervisory exclusion, by using the nonstatutory
managerial exclusion, and by refusing to apply the managerial
exclusion as the Board had applied it, was able to circumvent
the limitations which Congress itself had placed on exclusions.
In its argument 44 7 before the Supreme Court in Yeshiva,
the Board emphasized the independent professional judgment
test 448 that it had developed and applied in earlier professional
cases. Although Justice Powell apparently understood the
test,44 9 he rejected it.450 Justice Powell stated that he could
find "no authority suggesting that that tension [between the
exclusion of managerial employees and the Act's inclusion of
professional employees] can be resolved by reference to the
'independent professional judgment' criterion." 4 5' The cases he
cited in support of this assertion, 45 2 however, demonstrate the
efficacy of the test. Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento,453 cited by Justice Powell, involved professional employees in the health care industry. In a long list of disputed
professionals, the Board found that only assistant area supervi45 4
sors and two clinical supervisors were excluded supervisors.
Both groups exercised authority in the interest of the employer.45 5 Justice Powell also cited Westinghouse Electric
Corp.456 and General Dynamics Corp.45 7 As already dis446. Id. at 1268-69.
447. 444 U.S. at 684.
448. See notes 347-87 supra and accompanying text.
449. See 444 U.S. at 683-84.
450. Id. at 686-87. Justice Powell inaccurately states that the Board had not
applied the independent professional judgment test in its Yeshiva decision. Id.
at 684.
451. Id. at 686-87.
452. In note 25 Justice Powell refers to the cases he cited in notes 13 and 14.
Regarding note 13, see the discussion of University of Vermont and PresbyterianMedical Center, notes 441-46 supra and accompanying text. In note 14, he
cites Bell Aerospace, see notes 304-45 supra and accompanying text; Sutter
Community Hosps. of Sacramento, 227 NZL.B. 181, 193 (1976); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58 (1974); and Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113

NJL.RB. 337, 339 (1955).
453. 227 N.L.R.B. 181 (1976).
454. Id. at 191-92.
455. Id. at 193.
456.

113 N.L.R.B. 337 (1955).

457. 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974).
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cussed,458 although the engineers in both cases had total responsibility for the projects they headed, the Board held that
they were neither supervisors nor managers. The cases cited
by Justice Powell thus demonstrate that the Board has only excluded those professional employees who exercise authority in
the interest of their employer; the independent professional
judgment test effectively insulates from exclusion professional
employees who exercise collective authority based on their professional interests and judgments.
Although the Board's collective authority construction
matches the wording of section 2(11) and had been applied by
the Board in prior professional cases, Justice Powell dismissed
the Board's construction with the statement that it "has never
459
been applied to supervisors who work through committees."
46
In support of this broad statement, he cited O the Board's decision in Florida Southern College.4 61 This case seems particularly inapposite. FloridaSouthern College was a typical college
faculty case, in which the Board created a broad unit of all fulltime and regular part-time faculty including departmental executive officers but excluding the Dean of Students. Moreover,
the Board's decisions regarding colleges and universities have
46 2
routinely excluded-deans as supervisors.
At the conclusion of his decision in Yeshiva, Justice Powell
observed:
We certainly are not suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals outside the Act in derogation of
Congress' expressed intent to protect them. The Board has recognized
that employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership
arguably may involve some divided loyalty. Only if an employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned with management.
We think these decisions accurately capture the intent of Congress,
and that they provide an appropriate starting point4 for
analysis in
63
cases involving professionals alleged to be managerial.

Although the first sentence disclaims an intent to exclude all
professionals as managers, given the collegial method of operation used by most professionals, that is the probable effect of
458. See notes 372-86 supra and accompanying text.
459. 444 U.S. at 685 n.21.
460. Id. Justice Powell also cited three cases involving employee stockholders who held majority control of three small companies: two taxi companies
and a plywood company.
461. 196 N.L.R.B. 888 (1972).
462. See note 367 supra and accompanying text.
463. 444 U.S. at 690 (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Powell's prior analysis and actual decision in
Yeshiva.464 The Board never assumed, as Justice Powell
states, "that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution are distinct, separable entities with
which a faculty member could not simultaneously be
aligned."465 On the contrary, as he acknowledges, academic excellence is the goal of both the faculty and the employer.466 As
the independent professional judgment test recognizes, the employer of professionals depends on their judgment and professional excellence. It is, however, inherent in the nature of
professionalism that professionals seek professional excellence
above all other goals and that the university, as an economic
entity increasingly administered by professional administrators, balances academic excellence against economic realities.
Indeed, it is clear that fiscal problems have created substantial
changes in university life, a fact Justice Powell chose to
disregard.467
464. In support of his second sentence, Justice Powell cites General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.LatB. 851 (1974), and two Board decisions, Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 NJ.R.B. 1059 (1951), and Skidmore, Owings and
Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920 (1971), involving architects who had "substantial planning responsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team members." 444
U.S. at 690 n.30. Since the routine discharge of professional duties in these
cases was in the context of the "[elmployer's established policy ... based on
directional change rather than on status quo," General Dynamics Corp., 213
N.L.RJ3. at 858, the facts and actual holdings of these cases would support the
inclusion of most professional employees. See notes 376-86 supra and accompanying text. Justice Powell also mentions that Congress "expressly approved"
the test of "whether the decisions alleged to be managerial or supervisory are
'incidental to' or 'in addition to' the treatment of patients" when it passed the
1974 Health Care Amendments. 444 U.S. at 690 n.30. See note 387 supra and accompanying text.
465. Id. at 688.
466. In such a university, the predominant policy normally is to operate
a quality institution of higher learning that will accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the limits of its financial resources. The
"business" of a university is education, and its vitality ultimately must
depend on academic policies that largely are formulated and generally
are implemented by faculty governance decisions. Faculty members
enhance their own standing and fulfill their professional mission by ensuring that the university's objectives are met. But there can be no
doubt that the quest for academic excellence and institutional distinction is a "policy" to which the administration expects the faculty to adhere, whether it be defined as a professional or an institutional goal. It
is fruitless to ask whether an employee is "expected to conform" to one
goal or another when the two are essentially the same.
Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
467. At Yeshiva, administrative concerns with scarce resources and
University-wide balance have led to occasional vetoes of faculty action.
But such infrequent administrative reversals in no way detract from
the institution's primary concern with the academic responsibilities entrusted to the faculty. The suggestion that faculty interests depart
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VI. CONCLUSION
Today's professionals have joined the rank and file. Professors are the employees of universities; doctors and nurses are
the employees of hospitals. As professionals they exercise discretion and judgment in their work and have responsibility for
matters of great importance to their employers. Their exclusion from the coverage of the NLRA would leave only clerical
and maintenance workers free to organize as covered employees under the Act. This would ignore common definitions of
university and hospital employees and would also be contrary
to Congress's specific intent to extend coverage of the NLRA to
professional employees and to nonprofit organizations.
Because large groups of professionals have become employees and thereby have lost the autonomy they enjoyed as
self-employed individuals, they need collective protection more
than ever before. The courts' antitrust and first amendment decisions, however, have eroded the traditional protection afforded by their professional trade associations, and Yeshiva
may block attempts at unionization.
The NLRB, attuned to the trends and realities of the American workplace, adopted an interpretation of the NLRA which
recognized the coarchical, professional model of labor relations.
By carefully construing the specific supervisory exclusion and
the nonstatutory managerial and confidential employee exclusions, it effectuated Congress's intent to broadly define the
term "employee" to specifically include professionals and to include the employees of nonprofit entities.
A majority of the Supreme Court, however, led by Justice
Powell, has precluded at least some of these employees from
unionizing by adopting an interpretation of the NLRA based on
an outmoded view of the American workplace. Employers have
thus won from the Supreme Court what they did not succeed
in winning from the conservative 1947 Congress. The Taft-Hartley Amendments specifically defined and included professionals; they defined and excluded only supervisors. Despite
employer pressure, nonprofits generally were not excluded and
the specific exclusion of nonprofit hospitals was deleted in 1974.
from those of the institution with respect to salary and benefits is even
less meritorious. The same is true of every supervisory or managerial
employee. Indeed, there is arguably a greater community of interest
on this point in the university than in industry, because the nature and
quality of a university depend so heavily on the faculty attracted to the

institution.

Id. at 688-89 n.27.
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The 1947 Congress never mentioned managerial employees and
considered excluded only those employees having confidential
information regarding labor relations.
The Court's decision in Yeshiva has ramifications not only
for employed professionals but for the entire work force. Jobs
for blue-collar workers are decreasing while those for white-collar and professional workers are increasing. Blue-collar employees historically have unionized, but employer opposition to
even blue-collar unionization is growing. White-collar and professional employees historically have not unionized and, after
Yeshiva, they may be prevented from doing so. Yeshiva may
also prevent blue-collar employees who work in nontraditional
job programs from unionizing. Moreover, an expansive definition of confidential employees may result in the exclusion of
many secretarial and clerical employees from NLRA coverage.
Thus, perhaps the only employees who are still entitled to enjoy the NLRA's promise of industrial democracy through collective bargaining are the fast shrinking group of traditional bluecollar workers.

